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Abstract
Using a randomized control trial, we examine whether offering adolescent girls non-
material resources – specifically, negotiation skills – can improve educational outcomes
in a low-income country. In so doing, we provide the first evidence on the effects of
an intervention that increased non-cognitive, interpersonal skills during adolescence.
Long-run administrative data shows that negotiation training significantly improved
educational outcomes over the next three years. The training had greater effects than
two alternative treatments (offering girls a safe physical space with female mentors and
offering girls information about the returns to education), suggesting that negotiation
skills themselves drive the effect. Further evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment,
which simulates parents’ educational investment decisions, and a midline survey sug-
gests that negotiation skills improved girls’ outcomes by moving households’ human
capital investments closer to the efficient frontier. This is consistent with an incomplete
contracting model, where negotiation allows daughters to strategically cooperate with
parents.
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1 Introduction
Why do two children with similar abilities and financial resources receive very different lev-
els of education and have vastly different outcomes? Much of the literature attributes the
variation in life outcomes that remains after accounting for observable characteristics to
non-cognitive skills. While these skills often develop in the critical period before age 5, neu-
roscience and developmental psychology have now identified a second critical period in early
adolescence during which crucial non-cognitive skills related to interpersonal communication
develop most quickly (Choudhury et al., 2006). In this paper, we study how a specific type
of non-cognitive skill – negotiation skills – taught during this second critical period can affect
the educational outcomes of girls in a particularly vulnerable environment.
Specifically, we study adolescent girls in Zambia, a country where female secondary school
enrollment is low (39%), as in much of Sub-Saharan Africa (31%1). For these girls, like many
girls in developing countries, early adolescence is a period of heightened challenges: school
dropout rates peak, and girls begin to menstruate and contend with future marriage and
motherhood. We find that teaching non-cognitive, interpersonal skills during this critical
period matters: girls who are taught negotiation skills have significantly better educational
outcomes in the following three years.
While much of the literature on educational investment has focused on the role of policies
that alleviate resource constraints such as offering scholarships (for a review, see Banerjee
et al. (2013)), we show that even in a very financially resource-constrained environment,
offering girls non-material resources that do not directly expand the household’s budget
constraint can meaningfully affect their human capital attainment. Moreover, our exper-
imental design allows us to unbundle the mechanisms through which negotiation training
affects economic outcomes, isolating the effect of skills from that of role models or infor-
mation. Through household surveys and lab-in-the-field games, we also illustrate how ne-
gotiation skills employed by daughters facilitate strategic cooperation within the household,
helping the family overcome the incomplete contracting problem at the heart of educational
investment.
We first measure the longer-term effects of negotiation skills by collecting multiple years
of administrative data on enrollment, attendance, school fee payments, and girls’ scores
on a high stakes exam at the end of 9th grade that determines whether they graduate
junior secondary school and where they will attend senior secondary school. We find that
negotiation training reduces the hazard of dropout by 10 percentage points and that it
increases aggregate measures of human capital attainment across the full set of human capital
1World Bank (2017).
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outcomes.
We next unbundle whether the negotiation treatment effects are driven by the acquisition
of negotiation skills themselves.2 To do so, we compare the negotiation effects to a “placebo”
intervention – a safe space treatment3 that offered girls a safe physical space to spend time
after school with the same Zambian, female mentors who taught the negotiation program.
This treatment was designed to capture the possible ancillary benefits of engaging in the
negotiation training, such as having time in a girls-only space, or exposure to a role model
(as well as the very small in kind transfers that were part of the program, such as lunch after
school). We also cross-randomize the negotiation treatment with another treatment that
provided girls with information about the returns to education. The comparison with this
treatment can shed light on whether the negotiation treatment’s effects are partly driven
by information about the returns to schooling communicated by examples in the curricu-
lum or the aspirations effect of interacting with an educated mentor, rather than the skills
themselves. We virtually always estimate larger effects for negotiation than the alternative
treatments, and for our aggregate measures of human capital attainment, the effects are sta-
tistically significantly different, suggesting that negotiation skills themselves matter rather
than just the ancillary benefits of the treatment. Additionally, using mediation analysis,
we show that a direct measure of a girl’s negotiation ability explains a large portion of the
negotiation treatment effect, further suggesting that the skills matter.
We then investigate the mechanisms through which negotiation skills lead to human capi-
tal investment in the household. Our main findings motivate a simple theoretical framework
that allows us to investigate behavior that is often opaque: how families make decisions
about educational investment. Just as a literature on intra-household bargaining shows
that spouses have different preferences and may fail to achieve efficient outcomes for the
household (Udry, 1996 and Ashraf, 2009), children and parents may also have different pref-
erences (Bursztyn and Coffman, 2012). In our data from Zambia, where – as in much of
Sub-Saharan Africa – secondary schooling is costly, daughters report wanting statistically
significantly more schooling than their parents want for them. This difference in prefer-
ences across generations can result in inefficiently low educational outcomes. In standard
bargaining models, households make efficient investments regardless of the preferences of
different household members. However, when there are incomplete contracting problems
within the household, imperfectly altruistic parents may under-invest in their children’s ed-
ucation (Banerjee, 2004). A theoretical literature in relational contracting (Chassang, 2010
2The focus on skills encompasses both the effect of the training on the returns to educational investment
as a complementary, non-cognitive input, as well as girls’ usage of the skills with parents, teachers, peers, and
other negotiating partners to both transfer information and achieve different intra-household allocations.
3The safe space program followed common female empowerment treatments throughout the world (Bald-
win, 2011) by providing a safe, physical space for girls to gather with a role model.
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and Watson, 1999) shows that dynamic strategic cooperation can lead to joint outcomes
that are closer to the efficient frontier. The negotiation curriculum we designed emphasized
identifying one’s own and one’s negotiating partner’s deeper interests and using this informa-
tion to brainstorm solutions that benefited both parties, creating routines of cooperation. In
economic terms, therefore, the curriculum is more closely aligned with increasing strategic
cooperation across many interactions, rather than increasing a girl’s bargaining power in
one-shot negotiations.
Our theoretical framework outlines different forces, consisting of altruism, expected re-
turns, and expected reciprocity, that will affect parents’ educational investment in girls on
the margin of this investment. Guided by the theory, we investigate the channels through
which negotiation skills could push these marginal girls “over the threshold,” leading them
to be educated. First, using midline survey data collected two months after the negotiation
training took place, we find evidence of increased reciprocity and routines of cooperation
within the household. Relative to both safe space and control girls, negotiation girls ask
their parents for more food, consistent with asking for more investment, but parents also
report that it is easier to get daughters to do chores and that daughters are more respectful,
demonstrating reciprocity. Additionally, negotiation girls are more likely to do chores on
Fridays, when they are least likely to conflict with studying and less likely to do chores on
other weekdays, consistent with households reallocating time in more efficient ways. Finally,
consistent with our framework, our analysis shows that higher ability girls experienced the
largest benefits from the negotiation training, suggesting that the benefits of the treatment
indeed accrued to girls who were on the margin of receiving educational investments in a
country where the female secondary school enrollment rate is low (39%).
To complement the evidence from the midline survey on day-to-day interactions between
parents and children, we also invited parents and children to play a lab-in-the-field investment
game when we administered the midline survey. This game allows us to test for strategic
cooperation between parents and children in a controlled environment where the household’s
efficient frontier is precisely defined. In the game, parents are given tokens that could be
converted into cell phone airtime;4 any tokens sent to their daughters were doubled, and then
daughters decided how many tokens to return to their parents and how many to redeem for
prizes. We randomly allowed some girls to communicate with their parents before parents
decided how many tokens to send. Since the returns to investment are high, if households are
at the efficient frontier, parents should send all of their tokens. This was not the case: parents
send about one-half of their tokens. However, for girls who were given the opportunity to
communicate, parents of girls who received negotiation training sent more tokens, and thus
4Airtime coupons are fungible and are common as a survey payment in sub-Saharan Africa.
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moved closer to the efficient frontier. As these effects only appear when negotiation girls are
given the opportunity to communicate, one possible mechanism is that girls who received the
negotiation training used their negotiation skills to credibly commit to return more tokens
to their parents. Using a random income shock given to some girls, we can confirm that
negotiation girls had a higher propensity to return the marginal token that they received.
Altogether, the findings from both the midline survey and the lab-in-the-field investment
game suggest that negotiation led parents and girls to cooperate more to increase their joint
gains when they could communicate, highlighting strategic cooperation as a pathway through
which negotiation could increase educational investment.
In addition to shedding light on how negotiation skills affect intrahousehold decision-
making regarding education, this paper is the first to establish a causal link between nego-
tiation training and economic outcomes – despite the large amount of resources and time
spent on such training at business and law schools around the world.5 This paper is also the
first that can isolate the effect of negotiation skills from potential role-model or information
effects.6 Training on negotiation is usually available to the most economically advantaged. If
these skills are indeed effective at changing economic outcomes, as we begin to demonstrate
in this paper, then providing this powerful tool only to those who start out life the most
privileged could perpetuate inequality. While there has been recent interest in expanding
access to these skills to other populations, there is no evidence on their efficacy in such
constrained environments. Our results suggest that negotiation skills could be taught to and
can aid people in a less privileged positions as well, such as young, female Zambians.7
This paper also contributes to two literatures. First, it contributes to a growing literature
on the importance of non-cognitive skills (Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Heckman et al.,
2006; Alan et al., 2016; Attanasio et al., 2015; Adhvaryu et al., 2016). By unbundling the
different components of a treatment that is designed to improve non-cognitive skills, we show
that the specific skills aspect of the intervention is important, rather than other components
of the intervention, and that these skills affect human capital investment in ways that may
alter a young woman’s long-run trajectory. Additionally, we provide new evidence on what
kinds of specific non-cognitive skills matter for an individual’s outcomes and on how to
5Negotiation training reaches more than 200,000 MBA and Executive students in the United States alone,
and in over 16,000 business schools worldwide (Murray, 2011)
6The sparse evidence of negotiation training’s efficacy rests on measures indicating the participant’s
ability to identify mutually-beneficial trades within simulated negotiations following training or on subjective
measures of negotiation efficacy (e.g., Gist et al., 1991; Movius, 2008; Nadler et al., 2003; Zerres et al., 2013).
Studies on negotiation measuring behavioral outcomes examine either only very short-term measures inside
the lab (e.g., Small et al. (2007) measure effects on propensity to negotiate research subject payment) or find
no support for negotiation training effects on behavioral measures (e.g., Hobfoll et al. (2002) find no effect
on rates of sexually transmitted diseases).
7The program now has been adapted and incorporated by the Ministry of Education into the national
life skills curriculum for all grade 8 students across Zambia.
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build the capacities that make an individual successful. Beyond unbundling the negotiation
training effect, we also provide evidence on specifically how these non-cognitive skills are
used. Importantly, from a policy perspective, we show that it is not too late to teach these
skills in adolescence, suggesting that these skills could be taught directly within the school
system.
Second, this paper contributes to a growing literature on intra-household bargaining and
inefficiencies in investment within the household (Udry, 1996; Ashraf, 2009; De Mel et al.,
2009; Bobonis, 2009; Doepke and Tertilt, 2014; Robinson, 2012; Schaner, 2015; Angelucci
and Garlick, 2016; Corno and Voena, 2016; Bergman, 2015; Giustinelli, 2016; Jensen and
Miller, 2017; Ashraf et al., 2016; Bau, 2016). While much of this literature has focused on
spouses rather than parents and children, this paper shows that, in a context where parents
and children have different preferences over educational investment, household members can
learn skills that facilitate strategic cooperation, helping households get closer to the efficient
frontier, in the spirit of Chassang (2010).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the negotiation treatment and the
experimental design in more detail. Section 3 measures the effect of the negotiation treatment
on human capital outcomes. Section 4 unbundles the negotiation effect by comparing it to
the effects of two alternative treatments, information and safe space. Section 5 establishes
a theoretical framework to guide our search for the mechanisms driving the negotiation
treatment effect and uses the midline survey and the lab-in-the-field investment game to test
for the different mechanisms. Section 6 tests for spillovers of the negotiation treatment on
untreated children. Section 7 concludes.
2 Experimental Design & Data
2.1 Experimental Design and Timeline
We designed the experiment to both measure the effects of the negotiation treatment and
to unbundle whether those effects are due to the negotiation skills themselves – including
any effect of these skills on the returns to educational investment – or due to auxiliary
benefits of the treatment, as well as to shed light on the mechanisms underlying these effects.
To accomplish our first objective of measuring the effect of negotiation training – which
provided girls with non-material resources, but did not directly affect financial constraints
– on educational outcomes, we randomly provided girls with the training and then tracked
them over the ensuing four years.
Unbundling the drivers of the negotiation treatment’s effect is important since the effect
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could be driven by the empowerment or aspiration effects of spending time in an all-female
space with a college-educated, female mentor, by improved information about the returns
to education from interacting with that mentor, or through elements of the curriculum that
used education as an example rather than by improved negotiation skills alone. To unbundle
the treatment effects, we study the effects of two alternative randomized interventions – a
safe space treatment that provided girls with the same female mentor and all-female space
but did not teach the negotiation curriculum, and a short information intervention that pro-
vided girls with information about the returns to education (in addition to information on
HIV prevention). We run a horse race between the negotiation treatment and the safe space
treatment, which non-overlapping samples of girls received, to test whether the negotiation
curriculum itself had effects beyond any empowerment or aspirational effects. The informa-
tion treatment, on the other hand, was cross-randomized with the negotiation treatment so
that we could compare both the raw negotiation and informational effects and test for any
interaction effects in case negotiation skills allowed girls to better pass information on to
their parents.8
Finally, to understand how negotiation skills affect girls’ long-term outcomes, we invited
the girls and their parents or guardians to play a lab-in-the-field game with one-another that
tested their degree of strategic cooperation under different treatments, allowing us to directly
test for cooperative routines between parents and children in a controlled environment where
the efficient frontier of investment is clearly defined. Additionally, we collected data from
the girls and their parents on variables like the timing of chores and asking for food, which
help capture the degree of day-to-day strategic cooperation at home.
The randomized controlled trial targeted 8th grade girls at 41 primary schools through-
out Lusaka, Zambia. Of the girls approached to take part in the experiment at these schools,
67% received permission from their guardians to participate (and agreed themselves), and
our randomization is within this group. At 29 schools, we conducted a girl-level randomiza-
tion into three groups: (1) control group, (2) safe space group, and (3) negotiation group.
This treatment assignment was cross-randomized with the brief informational treatment,
delivered during the baseline survey. An additional 12 schools were assigned to be “pure
control” schools, to assist in measuring spillovers, using a matched-pair randomization strat-
egy. Baseline data was collected from all girls whose parents consented, the interventions
then took place, and then two months later, midline data was collected at the same time as
the lab-in-field experiment was conducted. We then continued to collect administrative data
8Information was provided on health and the returns to education, motivated by Jensen (2010), who shows
that providing information on the returns to education increases educational attainment in the Dominican
Republic, and Dupas (2011), who shows that providing teenage girls in Kenya with information on HIV risk
affects sexual behavior and pregnancy.
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on the girls’ educational and pregnancy outcomes for the next three years. Figure 1 docu-
ments the timeline of the study. Figure A1 shows the template for the letter sent to parents
to invite them to participate in the study. Below, we discuss each stage of the experiment
and data collection in more detail.
Baseline Survey. Between May and June 2013, we collected the baseline data. The
survey was conducted with the girls during after-school meetings in private away from their
peers. During this baseline survey, we randomly provided an information session to half the
girls lasting approximately one hour on two main topics: education and health. Appendix
A provides a more detailed description of the information treatment.
Treatment Assignment and Intervention. Following the baseline survey, within each of the
principal 29 schools, girls were randomly allocated to one of three different treatments after
stratifying on classroom and information status: negotiation, safe space, or a control group,
which did not receive a treatment (but were told it would be offered later). The girls were
told that a computer would randomly select the groups so that families and teachers would
have no influence over the experimental assignment. The remaining 12 schools received no
treatment.9
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the 29 treated schools, and the results of balance
tests between intervention groups, controlling for school fixed effects. The table shows that
most characteristics are balanced for the negotiation treatment relative to the safe space
and control treatments, with p-values for joint tests of whether the covariates significantly
predict treatment status always greater than 0.457, but there is some evidence that girls who
received the negotiation treatment are lower ability. They are 4.5 and 5.6 percentage points
less likely to read or speak Nyanja (the vernacular) excellently and 4.9 percentage points
less likely to speak English excellently relative to the control. However, given that we test
balance across 14 outcomes, these may be significant by chance, and if negotiation girls are
slightly lower ability, this is likely to negatively bias our results.
Appendix Table A1 compares our intervention schools to other urban government schools
in Zambia that offer 8th grade (columns 1-5), all government schools in Zambia that offer
8th grade (columns 6-8), and all Zambian schools, including private and community schools,
9To assign the 12 pure control schools, we created 12 matched pairs of 24 schools that were most similar
to one another on academic, socioeconomic, and geographic metrics, then randomly assigned one of each
pair to be a treatment school, and one to be pure control. Because only 24 schools are assigned this way, we
are under-powered to detect small differences in outcomes, but can use these schools to provide suggestive
evidence on the extent of spillovers. Additionally, because of the small number of pairs, there are some
balance issues in the comparison between the pure control schools and their matched pairs. For this reason,
when measuring spillovers, we use propensity score matching at the girl level rather than comparing schools.
The negotiation training was expanded to the girls in the pure control schools following term two of 9th
grade (but not the control group in the treated schools), and so the pure control schools can only be used
to check for spillovers early in the program. However, with the exception of pregnancy and enrollment, all
our outcomes (fee payment, attendance, and exam take-up and scores) were exclusively collected during this
earlier period.
8
that offer 8th grade (columns 9-11). The intervention schools are larger than other urban
schools on average,10 but otherwise resemble other urban government schools in terms of the
male and female dropout rates and resources. Thus, although our intervention took place in
Lusaka, we expect our results to be externally valid across urban Zambia. In contrast, our
intervention schools have lower dropout rates and more resources than the average school in
Zambia.
We summarize the negotiation, safe space, and pure control treatments briefly as follows,
with more details on the negotiation treatment in the next sub-section and further details
on the safe space treatment in Appendix B:
1. Negotiation Group (801 girls): Girls participated in six after-school sessions over two
weeks with female coaches consisting of training on negotiation and interpersonal com-
munication. Sessions consisted of about 15–20 girls. They received free lunch on session
days, a notebook, and pens.
2. Safe Space Group (785 girls): Girls participated in six after-school sessions over two
weeks with the same coaches, during which they could play games, study or do home-
work, or just talk with other girls. Sessions consisted of about 15–20 girls. The same
female Zambian role models who taught the negotiation sessions supervised these ses-
sions. Girls received free lunch on session days, a notebook, and pens.
3. Pure Control Group (780 girls): Girls assigned to this group did not participate in any
after-school program but were told they would be offered the treatment at the end of
the study period.
The intervention was implemented at 6-8 schools at a time on a rolling basis. Approximately
one to two months after the intervention and again during the first term of grade 9, a one-day
booster session, led by the same coaches as the initial program, was held at each school with
the negotiation and safe space groups.11
Lab-in-the-Field Investment Game and Midline Survey. Between September and October
of 2013, all the girls in the sample were invited to attend a lab-in-the-field investment game
and midline survey with a parent or guardian, where they participated in a randomly chosen
version of the investment game, described in more detail in Section 5.3. These games were
designed to simulate the human capital investment problem in the presence of incomplete
10This is unsurprising since, to be chosen for the intervention, a school had to be large enough to have
sufficiently-sized negotiation, treatment, and controls groups.
11Booster sessions were two hours long (the same length as one of the six training sessions) and reviewed
the topics and repeated some role-plays from the main curriculum. Time was also left for general Q&A on the
negotiation skills they learned (but not particular applications). The safe space girls also had a “booster,”
which was just an additional safe space session.
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contracting by requiring parents to decide how much to invest in daughters – with a high
return – and then requiring daughters to decide how much of that investment to return to
parents. Thus, the game sheds light on the mechanisms through which negotiation affects
parents’ human capital investment decisions. Daughters and their guardians also participated
in a midline survey at this time, which covered topics such as the girl’s negotiating ability,
the girl’s behavior, and the guardians’ impressions of girls’ behavior.
Administrative Data Collection. From the start of the treatment until the end of 9th
grade, we collected data on school fee payment, national exam attendance, attendance rates,
and national exam scores from the treatment schools, and until term 1 of grade 11, we
continued to collect enrollment data and data on whether girls became pregnant.12 We
discuss each of these outcome measures in detail below, and Appendix C provides more
information on the administrative data collection process.
2.2 Negotiation Treatment
The program was comprised of six, two-hour training sessions, including activities like role-
play, group discussion, storytelling, and games building on materials from Curhan (1998) and
Mercy Corps (2009) and the classic negotiation texts of Fisher et al. (2011) and Ury (1993).
Attendance rates for these sessions were high and were not statistically significantly different
between the negotiation and safe space treatments.13 Some activities directly mimicked real
situations that girls might face, such as negotiating with siblings or parents over household
disagreements, refusing unwanted sexual advances from older men, and asking their parents
to pay for school fees. Other types of exercises were more abstract and intended to highlight
the gains from cooperation. These included games such as a prisoner’s dilemma-type game
called “Lion-Zebra” that illustrated the impact of the other party’s decisions on one’s own
outcomes and how different strategies affected long-term cooperation.
The curriculum (McGinn et al., 2012) was structured around four key principles: me, you,
together, and build (see Appendix Figure A2).14 Below, we describe each of these principles
in more detail. We also use stories from the girls’ notebooks (collected at the booster session
in term 2 of grade 8) and stories relayed to us by the negotiation coaches to show how the
girls practiced these principles at home.
12Following the expansion of the treatment to pure control schools, data was only collected from treated
schools.
13The average girl in the negotiation treatment attended 4.8 out of the 6 days of training, and the average
girl in the safe space treatment attended 5 days. Consequently, ITT and TOT regressions that instrument
for number of classes attended with whether a girl was assigned to the negotiation or safe space treatment
deliver similar results.
14The curriculum is freely available under creative commons license at
https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cbmp/pages/content/girlsarise.
10
Me. This principle taught girls to understand their own interests – that is, to identify
their deeper needs and values rather than the proximate cause of a dispute. Knowing one’s
own interests is a necessary step for identifying potential gains from trade, since a girl can
then identify other ways a negotiation partner can make her better off beyond conceding on
a disputed issue. Additionally, girls were taught to know their outside option so that they
recognized at what point they would not compromise and entered the negotiation with a
back up plan. Then, they could walk away if the agreement options did not serve the girls’
needs and interests.15,16
Girls were also taught to focus on regulating their emotions, “taking five” when they
were angry. Fabiansson and Denson (2012) show that such emotional regulation is impor-
tant since anger hinders bargaining. Emotional regulation may have also improved parents
and daughters’ relationships since, in subsection 5.2, we find that the parents considered
negotiation girls more respectful.
You. This principle emphasizes the importance of understanding the other party. Girls
learned to “step to the side” of the other party, taking their perspective. Perspective-taking
entails, for example, asking open-ended questions to determine the other party’s interests.
Just as identifying the girl’s own deeper interests is a necessary step for identifying potential
gains from trade, so is identifying the interests of the other party. Indeed, Galinsky et al.
(2008) show that individuals who can take their partners’ perspectives uncover underlying
interests and generate more efficient solutions in cases where a deal seemed impossible.
This step also included choosing a way to approach the other party respectfully that
emphasizes shared values and is consistent with cultural expectations. This was particularly
important in the Zambian context, where girls are expected to be obedient and not to talk
back to their parents. For example, asking direct questions is considered to be rude, so girls
were taught to use indirect questions to identify their parents’ interests.17
Together. This principle focused on bringing the two sides together. First, girls were
15One notebook entry describes how a girl utilized knowing her outside option in a negotiation with a
boyfriend who wanted to have sex with her:
I told him that I am sorry, I can’t take it, and I asked him what was his other option, but
unfortunately, he had no other option. Then, I told him that... I have other options. It’s either
we end this relationship or stop telling me about this nonsense.
16Calculating a walkaway value and incorporating the walkaway value into negotiation planning and exe-
cution is fundamental to negotiation analytics (Raiffa, 1982 and Walton and McKersie, 1965).
17One girl describes the importance of choosing the right approach in her notebook:
One day I wanted to ask for money for school shoes from my mother. Then I went to ask
my mother, I just went without greeting her, didn’t kneel down... and she did not answer me
because I did not kneel down. Then I went again and I asked her, first I greeted her, knelt
down, and asked indirect questions; she didn’t refuse, she gave me because I respected and knelt
down.
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taught to find common ground with the other person by emphasizing their shared values
rather than differences of opinion. For example, a girl might say, “We both care about
education” rather than, “If you cared about me, you would pay my school fees.” Second, they
were taught to recognize that the other party’s “no” may come from an external roadblock or
problem that could be solved together if they could identify ways to remove that roadblock.18
Build. Finally, girls were taught to look for “win-win” agreements that met the needs of
both negotiating partners. This step builds crucially on the previous steps, which allowed
girls to identify both their own and their partner’s true interests and discover the roadblocks
leading to conflict. Girls were taught to brainstorm ways to overcome external roadblocks and
find productive trades with their partners. They were taught that “building an agreement is
like building a house you can both live in,” and therefore, that an agreement should give both
parties something they want. In effect, this skill taught girls to use what they had learned
in previous steps in the negotiation to look for solutions closer to the efficient frontier. A
story relayed to us by one of the negotiation coaches illustrates a girl successfully using all
the steps together to convince her parents to pay her school fees:
I asked my parents if they could talk with me. I put on my chitenge [traditional
material skirt], and knelt before them. I chose to approach with respect and so
they asked me to stand and sit in the chair near them and tell them what I wanted
to say. I said that I really wanted to be able to go back to school but wasn’t able
to because the school fees weren’t paid. They said I knew that the family had no
more money so it wasn’t possible. I said I know that mom sells chickens out of
the house. I see that some people sell them in the marketplace nearby. If I can
sell some chickens in the market over the school holiday, could I use the money
for my school fees? They agreed and that is how I got to go back to school.
As a whole, the curriculum was designed to allow girls to understand the other party’s
interests and identify gains from trade that were not immediately obvious. By choosing the
right approach, regulating their emotions, and finding common ground with their partners,
girls were taught to initiate cooperation and sustain positive relationships with their negotia-
tion partners over the long term. Thus, the approach laid out by the curriculum more closely
maps onto repeated, cooperative interactions rather than a single interaction where a girl
18A participating girl discusses identifying a roadblock behind her sister’s refusal to do her hair:
One day, I asked my sister to do my hair. She refused then I tried to ask her why. She did
not answer. Later when her baby was asleep I asked her why she refused. I decided to pick a
time when she was not angry. I chose the approach. We shared our interests. She said she
could not do it because the baby was troubling her. As we talked and shared more we decided
on an agreement. She said she could do my hair if I would watch over her baby while she took
her bath.
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tries to extract the entire surplus. A theoretical literature in relational contracting demon-
strates how the establishment of dynamic cooperation can lead to more efficient outcomes
(Chassang, 2010; Kranton, 1996; Ghosh and Ray, 1996).
To test whether girls in fact learned the negotiation curriculum and could apply what they
learned to a new situation, a scenario was included in the midline survey two months later.
Girls were asked to imagine they were in the following situation: they needed to study for a
test and had asked their sister to take care of their younger brother, but the sister refused,
saying that she wanted to go visit a friend. The girls were asked three open-ended questions
about what they would do. The responses were coded, blind to treatment, on a scale of 1-7,
with “7” indicating the best answer according to the negotiation curriculum.19 Appendix
Table A2 regresses girls’ scores on each of these questions and their average score across the
questions on an indicator variable for whether they received the negotiation treatment. As
the table shows, girls who were taught negotiation scored substantially better on all three
questions. Given that the midline occurred several months after the negotiation classes, this
provides evidence that the classes had long-term effects on girls’ knowledge of negotiation:
girls in the negotiation treatment acquired an understanding of negotiation skills and how to
apply them, suggesting that they could potentially apply these skills in their everyday lives.
Additionally, it shows that the safe space and control girls who did not receive the training
were not able to fully learn the negotiation skills from their classmates.
2.3 Long-term Outcome Measures
To measure the effects of the experimental treatments on girls’ educational outcomes, we
focus on seven different measures, each of which may capture human capital investments in
different parts of the ability distribution. We discuss each of these measures below.
Paid School Fees. This measure is coded as 1 if parents had paid all school fees by the
end of grade 9 and 0 otherwise. After the girls in our sample left their junior secondary
experimental schools for many different senior secondary schools following grade 9, we were
no longer able to collect this administrative measure. Since girls had to be enrolled in 8th
grade to participate in the experiment, any variation in this measure related to the negotia-
tion training would likely occur for the more disadvantaged girls. Indeed, among the control
group, 67% of girls had a zero balance at the end of 9th grade.
Took National Exam. This measure is coded as 1 if girls took the 9th grade national exam
and 0 otherwise. Passing this exam is required for girls to graduate from junior secondary
19We developed a 7-point coding scheme, where 1 = no reflection of negotiation lessons and 7 = full
integration of me-you-together-build. Coding was based on evidence of: attention to both parties’ interests;
working together to solve the problem; dealing with emotions; brainstorming solutions. The coding of the
responses was blind to the treatment.
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school and girls are assigned to secondary schools based on their national exam results. Be-
cause the exam was extremely high stakes, most girls (90% of the control) took the exam,
suggesting that any variation for this measure caused by the negotiation treatment would
be most likely to occur among the most disadvantaged girls.
Threshold Math and English. These two measures are coded as 1 if girls took the na-
tional exam and scored in the top 25th percentile in the national exam in math and English
respectively and zero otherwise. Thus, these measures combine taking the exam and doing
well to avoid the attrition that would occur if we only examined scores and dropped the
observations of the girls who did not take the exam. These thresholds are particularly im-
portant because girls must score approximately in the top 25th percentile to be assigned to a
full-time upper-level secondary school and the school that they are assigned to also depends
on their score, although the government is unwilling to reveal exact thresholds. Girls who
pass the exams but score lower can attend half-day schools. Thus, we view these measures
as capturing the intensive margin of being allowed to attend a higher quality school and
of improving effort and learning among girls who attend school. We focus on math and
English rather than other subjects in the national exam because they are required subjects.
In contrast to the previous two measures, these measures are more likely to capture any
negotiation effects for less-disadvantaged girls.
Attendance Rate. This variable measures the average attendance rate of girls across the
terms attendance rates were collected (terms 2 and 3 of grade 8 and terms 1 and 2 of grade
9) conditional on being enrolled in school. As with paying school fees, we could no longer
collect this measure after girls dispersed to different upper-level secondary schools. This
outcome is rarely missing due to non-enrollment because all but 2.7% of girls were enrolled
at the end of grade 8 and possess at least one or two terms of attendance measures. We view
this measure as both providing information on the important intensive margin of attending
school rather than the extensive margin and as providing information on girls’ educational
investments throughout the ability distribution. Among the control girls, average attendance
rates are 54% and range from 27% at the 5th percentile to 76% at the 95th percentile.
Enrollment. We measure enrollment in two ways. Having collected indicator variables for
enrollment at the end of grade 8, beginning and end of grade 9, beginning of grade 10 and
beginning of grade 11, we can exploit the dynamic aspect of this data and estimate hazard
models for dropout. This is the only educational measure that captures long-term educa-
tional outcomes after the high stakes period of taking the national exam (in grade 9), leaving
junior secondary school, and enrolling in senior secondary school. In contrast to enrollment
at the end of 8th grade, which is nearly universal, only 52% of control girls are marked
as enrolled in grade 10, and 42% are marked as enrolled in grade 11. Thus, we view this
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measure, particularly in later grades, as capturing important, longer-term investments, likely
among somewhat more advantaged girls. To make our enrollment measure comparable with
the other measures, we also average across the indicator variables for enrollment to create
an average time spent enrolled measure, which is 71% for control girls.
Pregnancy. Our last long-term outcome measure is an in indicator variable for whether a
girl was reported to have become pregnant prior to the start of 11th grade. This could have
been impacted by the negotiation training both through direct negotiations with partners,
as well as through the opportunity cost of schooling channel described by Duflo et al. (2015).
Reported pregnancies are relatively rare (4% of the control group), which may be reflective
of under-reporting, but additionally indicates that any variation in this measure due to ne-
gotiation would be predominantly among very disadvantaged girls.
Aggregate Measures. In addition to these individual measures, we aggregate these mea-
sures into a human capital index (which excludes pregnancy) and a full index, which includes
pregnancy, in two ways. First, we form an index simply by first standardizing each of the
individual variables and then averaging over them.20 Second, we follow Kling et al. (2004)
and Clingingsmith et al. (2009) and estimate our treatment effects as average effect sizes.21
As O’Brien (1984) shows and Kling et al. (2007) note, average effect sizes allow for the
formation of a global test statistic with the maximum power against the alternative that all
the effects are equal to 0. In our context, the use of average effect sizes and indices have two
advantages. First, they reduce the possibility of false positives due to multiple hypothesis
testing by allowing us to jointly test the hypothesis that the treatment affects human capital
with a single test statistic. Second, these measures increase our statistical power by allow-
ing us to combine information across multiple measures. Intuitively, if a treatment were to
have positive effects on all outcomes (even if the effects are not significant), this would be
unlikely to occur by chance. Using aggregate measures allows us to exploit such additional
information.
3 The Effect of the Negotiation Training Program
In this section, we estimate the effects of the negotiation treatment on educational outcomes
by comparing the girls treated with negotiation to the control group within the treatment
20We note that treatment effects measured with this index will not be mechanically more precise due to
any “double-counting” of highly correlated outcomes. If we were to average over the same outcome variable
two times, we would just recover the original outcome variable.
21To form average effect sizes, we run stacked regressions of our outcomes on the treatment of interest,
allowing the treatment to have different effects by outcome. We then scale the effect sizes by the standard
deviation of the control group and take their average to arrive at the final effect size. Running the stacked
regressions allows us to estimate the full covariance matrix, which can be used to test the hypothesis that
the average effect size is equal to 0.
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schools. There has been substantial focus on the role of material resources and financial
constraints in girls’ educational completion, and thus this section aims to test whether the
non-material resources that negotiation provides increase human capital acquisition even
without directly affecting households’ financial constraints. We arrive at our estimates of
negotiation effects in two ways. First, we exploit the dynamic nature of our enrollment data,
the flip-side of which is dropout, to estimate a Cox hazard model for dropout. This model
takes the form
λ(t|Xi) = λ0(t)exp(pi0 + pi1negotiationi + αs + ΠXi), (1)
where i denotes a girl, s denotes a school, λ(t|Xi) is the hazard rate for dropout in period t,
negotiationi is an indicator variable equal to 1 if girl i was assigned to receive the negotiation
treatment and 0 otherwise, αs are school fixed effects, and Xi is a vector of control variables.
Throughout this paper, to maximize precision, we usually include a rich set of socioeconomic
controls in our regressions, consisting of controls for both parents being alive, living with
one’s biological father, living with one’s biological mother, living with both parents, parents
paying school fees at baseline, ethnicity fixed effects, and indicator variables for whether
a girl reads and speaks Nyanja and English excellently or well, as well as a control for
whether a girl received the information treatment.22 However, to show that the results are
not sensitive to our choice of controls, we also report results including only a parsimonious
set of controls consisting of the three variables (reading and speaking Nyanja excellently and
speaking English excellently) that appear to be unbalanced across the negotiation treatment
and the control (see Table 1) and the information treatment. In these regressions, our
coefficient of interest is β1, the effect of negotiation, and β1 is identified as long as there is
within-school balance by treatment (as the joint tests in Table 1 suggest) and the control
group is not contaminated by spillovers. In Section 6, we use our set of pure control schools
to test for this contamination. In the hazard regressions, we cluster our standard errors at
the individual level to account for the fact that girls’ outcomes are interdependent over time.
Second, for each outcome and the human capital and full indices, which average over the
individual outcomes, we estimate the negotiation effects with the following regression
yis = β0 + β1negotiationi + αs + ΓXi + is, (2)
where yis is our outcome of interest and Xi is defined as before.
Table 2 reports the estimates from equation 1 with the full set of controls (column 1)
22Girls’ ability to read Nyanja and English was assessed by asking them to read a sentence aloud. The
girls’ speaking ability was assessed by asking them to describe the steps to make a cup of tea in English and
Nyanja.
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and the parsimonious set (column 2). The estimates with both sets of controls are almost
quantitatively identical, and both indicate that the hazard of dropout for negotiation girls is
10 percentage points lower than for control girls. Table 3 reports the results for the full set of
administrative outcomes. Panel A reports the estimates for the human capital index and its
components, while Panel B reports the estimates for the full index and pregnancy, its addi-
tional component, and Figure 2 visually reports the same estimates of the negotiation effect
as in panel A. The coefficients are reported in both the natural units of the outcomes and in
standard deviations of the control group, so that they are comparable to the magnitudes of
the index estimates and average effect sizes. Consistent with the findings from the hazard
model, negotiation also positively and significantly affects average enrollment, increasing it
by 0.097sd. Negotiation also marginally significantly affects attendance, increasing average
attendance by 0.061sd. While the effects on the remaining outcomes are statistically insignif-
icant, they are consistently in the expected direction, and this is captured by the fact that
effects of negotiation on the human capital and full indices and average effect sizes are all
positive and significant. Furthermore, the p-value for the human capital average effect size
is 0.001, indicating that even under the most conservative correction for multiple hypothesis
testing – the Bonferroni correction, which assumes the outcome variables in the regressions
are uncorrelated with one another – the effects of negotiation are statistically significant.23,24
In Table 4, we further examine whether the average effect size estimates are robust to
the inclusion of different controls or varying the components used in the estimation of the
human capital average effect size. The second row of Table 4 shows that including only the
parsimonious set of controls leads to similar estimates to the full set. The remaining rows
show that no one component of the index drives the results. Even when we omit enrollment as
an outcome, the average effect size is 0.060sd (relative to 0.066 with the full set of outcomes).
In general, the average effect size estimates are quite stable when we omit each component of
the index individually, as well as both test score components, with estimates ranging between
0.060sd and 0.074sd. Thus, we conclude that providing adolescent, Zambian girls with non-
material resources by teaching them negotiation skills within-school increases human capital
over the subsequent years. These human capital effects are driven both by improvements
on the intensive margin (higher test scores and school attendance for enrolled girls) and the
23Under the Bonferroni correction, to keep the probability of type 1 error constant as the number of
independent regressions increases, one applies a cut-off value for a significant p-value of αN , where N is the
number of regressions and α is the desired level of significance. Therefore, for the 11 regressions here, the
value for 5% significance would be 0.005. We note that this correction is particularly conservative in this
case since, by definition, indices and average effect sizes are not independent of their components.
24As an additional test, we also perform a Westfall-Young permutation test across all the regressions for
the human capital index. In the test, we permute the treatment 2,500 times and each time calculate the
p-values for each regression, including the index and the AES. We then note the percent of the time the
minimum p-value across all tests falls below the p-value for the human capital AES. The implied p-value for
our AES in this permutation test is 0.007.
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extensive margin (greater enrollment).
4 Unbundling the Treatment Effect
4.1 Negotiation vs. Safe Space and Information
The previous section showed that the negotiation training, a non-material intervention that
did not directly affect household’s budget constraints, positively affected girls’ educational
outcomes. The next question is whether this effect was driven by negotiation skills themselves
or by ancillary components of the treatment. Thus, in this section, we compare the effects of
the negotiation treatment to the effects of two alternative treatments, information and safe
space. The safe space treatment is designed to capture all the other benefits offered by the
negotiation program apart from the skills training itself, including female mentorship, the
time in a safe environment, and the small in kind transfers of daily lunch and a notebook. The
information treatment is designed to capture any possible informational transmission that
could have occurred through the negotiation training, either by exposure to female mentors
who were themselves educated (thus indicating the value of education) or through examples
used in the training on the topic of education. Additionally, the information treatment was
cross-randomized to test for a positive interaction between a treatment that emphasized
information and the negotiation skills which could be used to convey this information, but
we find no such interaction effect.25
Although the safe space treatment was designed as an analogue to the “placebo control”
in medical trials, because it involved the same amount of time, but without the need to learn
negotiation skills during that time, it could have also carried benefits orthogonal to those
provided by the negotiation training (e.g., time to do homework and interact informally
with other girls). Similarly, the information treatment may have contained more dense and
useful information than the negotiation treatment. Thus, differences between the negotiation
training effect and the safe space and informational effects may be a lower-bound on the
marginal impact of the specific negotiation skills.
Table 5 replicates the regressions in Table 3 but now includes the full sample of students in
treated schools and reports the estimates of the safe space and information treatment effects,
as well as p-values for one-sided tests of whether the negotiation, safe space, and information
treatments have different effects. We find no evidence that information about the returns
to education alone affects human capital in this context. We do estimate positive effects of
safe space, but only the enrollment effect is (marginally) significant. Additionally, the safe
25This table is available on request.
18
space coefficients are consistently smaller in magnitude than the negotiation ones and for the
average effect sizes, which maximize statistical power, we reject that safe space has the same
or larger effects than negotiation. In Appendix Table A3, we repeat the robustness exercise
in Table 4 with the full sample of girls in treated schools and report coefficients for safe space
and information as well. As the table shows, the average effect size of negotiation is always
significantly greater than the information treatment. For the comparison to safe space, the
point estimates of negotiation are always larger, and in most of the specifications, the effects
of negotiation are significantly greater. While we are under-powered to differentiate the
negotiation, safe space, and information effects on most individual outcomes, the weight
of the evidence from our aggregate measures suggests that the negotiation treatment had
greater effects on human capital than the safe space and information treatments.
These results suggest that the skills taught in the negotiation treatment positively affected
girls’ later human capital attainment, rather than the ancillary elements of the treatment.
To more directly test whether this is the case, we perform a suggestive mediation analysis.
In Appendix Table A4, we rerun the specifications in Table 5 for the human capital and full
indices, including measures of girls’ knowledge of negotiation as explanatory variables. For
this analysis and the analysis in the next subsection, we focus on the indices rather than
average effect sizes both because indices provide us with a single outcome variable that is
simpler to work with and because generally, our results using the indices as outcome variables
are quantitatively similar to those with the average effect sizes, if less precise.26 We measure
knowledge of negotiation in two ways. First, we average over girls’ scores on the three
negotiation measures coded from the girls’ responses to the negotiation scenario questions
presented at midline (See Section 2.2 above). Second, to reduce measurement error, we
instrument for girls’ scores on the third measure with their scores on the first two measures.
Since only 70% of girls came to the midline survey, we also replicate our estimates without
these knowledge controls for this different sample, though as Appendix Table A5, which
reports the correlates of attending the midline survey, shows, the negotiation treatment did
not predict attending the midline.
There are two key results in Appendix Table A4. First, among the girls who attended
the midline survey, the effects of the negotiation treatment on the human capital and full
indices are 80%-90% larger than for the full sample of girls. While negotiation training does
not predict attending the midline survey, girls who appeared in the midline survey were
more advantaged on average than those who did not (Appendix Table A5). Thus, the larger
treatment effect among this sub-sample suggests that the negotiation training had hetero-
26For the results for the OLS regressions in Appendix Table A4, using the AES indeed delivers quantita-
tively similar but more precise estimates of the negotiation and knowledge of negotiation effects.
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geneous effects – a finding that we explore further in the next subsection. Second, though
our measures of negotiation knowledge are unlikely to fully capture negotiation skills, the
mediation analysis indicates that negotiation knowledge plays a substantial role in explain-
ing the treatment effects. We find that including the mean knowledge measure reduces the
negotiation coefficient for the human capital index (column 2) by 19%, while including the
IV measure, which reduces measurement error, reduces it by 41%.
4.2 Heterogeneity in the Negotiation Effect
Based on the findings in the previous subsection, we now further explore heterogeneity in the
negotiation treatment effect on the human capital index. To search for this heterogeneity in a
principled way, we draw upon the machine-learning, honest causal tree methodology proposed
by Athey and Imbens (2016). Appendix D provides the details of this procedure, but three
points are worth highlighting. First, we split the data into two non-overlapping, randomly
chosen samples, so that we use one subsample to determine the heterogenity and use a distinct
subsample to estimate our point estimates and confidence intervals. This ensures that our
confidence intervals are valid and that we are not merely identifying spurious relationships
by “over-predicting” random variation in the data. Second, consistent with the drivers
of educational investment in our theoretical framework in the next section, we specifically
search for heterogeneity in the negotiation effect by ability and parental altruism, where
ability is proxied by the first factor of a factor analysis of the Nyanga and English ability
variables and altruism is proxied as the first factor of a factor analysis of the variables that
capture whether a child lives with her biological parents and has parents paying school fees
at baseline. Third, while our machine learning procedure identifies sources of heterogeneity
in the data, it does not necessarily identify all sources of heterogeneity.
The results of the machine learning exercise on the training sample show that negotiation
has heterogeneous effects by ability, with the strongest effects for those in the top 40th
percentile of the ability distribution. In Table 6, we estimate the effects of negotiation on
the human capital index and its components in the distinct estimation sample, allowing these
effects to vary by whether girls are in the top 40th percentile of the ability distribution. We
find that negotiation has large effects for the high ability group, increasing the human capital
index by 0.131sd and improving attendance rates by 0.188sd and enrollment rates by 0.228sd.
In contrast, the treatment had smaller effects at lower ability levels. The heterogeneity we
find is consistent with the outcomes for which we see the strongest effects of the negotiation
treatment in the full sample – for example, in the full sample, we find strong effects of
negotiation on enrollment, an outcome that varies among higher ability girls in 10th and
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11th grade. In contrast, we see less of an effect on outcomes like paying fees in 9th grade
and taking the national exam, which are likely to only vary for more disadvantaged girls.
Additionally, since higher ability girls are more likely to attend the midline survey (see
Appendix Table A5), this result may explain the differences in the effects estimated in Table
3, which uses the full sample of girls, and Appendix Table A4, which uses the sample for
whom measures of knowledge of negotiation were available. Finally, the fact that girls in
the top 40 percent of the ability distribution are most affected by the negotiation training
accords with the fact that a girl who completes 8th grade in the Zambian DHS has a 44%
chance of completing 12th grade, suggesting that girls in this ability range are on the margin
of receiving more educational investments and continuing in school. Our model in the next
section formalizes this intuition.27,28
5 Mechanisms
In this section, to fix ideas about what mechanisms could drive the negotiation effect, we
first develop a simple theoretical framework. Guided by this framework, we then test for
these mechanisms in two ways. We first report results from our midline survey, which allows
us to document the effects of negotiation on interactions within the household. We then
report results from a lab-in-the-field investment game that girls played with their parents or
guardians and which was designed to capture elements of the schooling investment decision
in a controlled environment where the efficient frontier for household investment is precisely
defined.
Both the midline survey and the investment game took place two months after the treat-
ment implementation. A letter was sent home with girls asking them to come to school
with their parent or guardian to participate in the midline survey and game, and 70% of
participating girls attended with a parent or guardian. Despite this incomplete sample, there
was no significant selective attrition by negotiation or safe space status (see rows 1 and 2 of
Appendix Table A5 for the associations between appearing in the sample and the negotiation
and safe space treatments).29
27In Appendix Table A6, we replicate the analyses in Table 6 but now allow for heterogeneity in safe
space’s effect. We do not find evidence of the same heterogeneity in the safe space effects, with safe space – if
anything – having larger effects for the lower ability girls. The fact that we do not see the same heterogeneity
in the safe space effect further suggests that negotiation operates through different channels than safe space.
28The results for information interacted with high and low ability are also available on request. We do not
report them here since, as for the average effects, we never see significant nor systematically positive effects
of the information treatment on outcomes.
29In the majority of cases (57%), girls attended the game with their biological mothers.
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5.1 Theoretical Framework
Based on our findings in the previous section, which suggest that negotiation training affects
girls who are on the margin of receiving more educational investment the most, we develop
a theoretical framework outlining different forces through which the treatment could affect
marginal girls. While, for simplicity, we model educational investment as a one-shot game, we
view this as a reduced-form representation of a reality where small educational investments
(such as a allowing a daughter to study) are made over time and daughters can reciprocate
these investments by strategically cooperating with their parents (e.g. by doing more chores
or doing chores more willingly).
5.1.1 Set Up
The parents’ problem is given by
max
E
Up = E(−f˜ + τ + βδR˜pi − δτ),
where E ∈ {0, 1} is 1 if parents invest in education and 0 otherwise, f˜ is the perceived cost of
schooling, β is the discount rate, δ ∈ [0, 1] is the parent’s altruism toward the daughter, R˜pi is
the parent’s perceived returns to education for a daughter i, and τ ∈ [0, τ¯ ] is the amount the
daughter can transfer to the parent to reciprocate the investment, and is a choice variable.
The fact that τ is bounded by τ¯ , even though daughters may want to transfer more than
τ¯ to parents, captures the fact that there is imperfect commitment between daughters and
parents. In particular, the ability to commit to future transfers is limited. We note that
f˜ might differ from the minimum cost of schooling if there are ways to reduce the cost of
schooling that parents and their children do not realize.
The daughter’s problem is given by
max
τ
Ud = E(−τ + βR˜di ),
where R˜di is the daughter’s belief about the returns to education. For simplicity, we assume
that the daughter always believes the returns to education are at least as high as the parents
believe they are, consistent with the idea that parental investment is a binding constraint
on daughters’ educational outcomes and with the fact that daughters report wanting more
education than their parents report wanting for them in our data. Then, a parent will
educate a daughter if
(1− δ)τ + βδR˜pi ≥ f˜ ,
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while, from the daughter’s perspective, the benefits of her education will outweigh the costs
if
βR˜di ≥ f˜ .
If R˜pi ≥ R˜∗i = f˜βδ , the daughter will choose τ = 0 and be educated. Define τ ∗ = max(
f˜−βδR˜pi
1−δ , 0)
as the minimum τ needed such that parents educate a daughter. Daughters for whom
R˜pi < R˜
∗
i and τ
∗ < τ¯ , the highest possible transfer to parents, will choose to reciprocate τ ∗
to their parents. Therefore, girls for whom R˜pi > R˜
∗∗
i are also educated, where
R˜∗∗i =
f˜ − (1− δ)τ¯
βδ
.
Girls for whom the cost of education is less their perceived discounted returns to education (so
that education is efficient from their perspective), such that βR˜di ≥ f˜ , will always be willing
to reciprocate enough to make the parent willing to educate them since their maximum
willingness to pay is βR˜di and the maximum compensation totally selfish parents would need
to educate their daughter is f˜ . Thus, as long as
τ ∗ > τ¯ and βR˜di ≥ f˜
for some girls i, there will be girls who desire to strategically cooperate with their parents so
that they are educated but cannot because they are limited by their inability to commit to
greater transfers than τ¯ . Note that if parents are perfectly altruistic (δ = 1), compensation
will not affect parents’ educational decisions since they will fully internalize the cost to the
daughters of strategically cooperating. If the above two expressions are satisfied, the cut-off
perceived returns by the parent for a girl to be educated will be given by R˜∗∗i and girls who
would be willing to compensate their parents for their education if it were possible will not
be educated. Therefore, an important aspect of the model is that, if parents are imperfectly
altruistic (δ < 1), they will invest less than is efficient in their daughters’ education from
their daughters’ perspective (Banerjee, 2004).
5.1.2 Potential Mechanisms in the Model
The components of R∗∗i illustrate several potential mechanisms through which negotiation
could affect education. Below, we consider each of these components, which if changed, could
reduce R∗∗i , increasing education levels.
Increasing τ¯ . If negotiation skills allow girls to strategically cooperate with parents, allow-
ing them to reciprocate their parents’ investments with a greater maximum τ would reduce
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the minimum returns to education needed to be educated and increase education. Examples
of such strategic cooperation could include girls offering to do more chores (or performing
chores more willingly) around the household. We view this mechanism as moving daughters
and parents closer to the effective efficient frontier for the household.
Reducing f˜ . If negotiation skills allow girls to reduce the effective cost of education by
providing information to parents about the timing of effective investment (e.g. moving
chores to Fridays or weekends so that a girl can study on weekdays rather than not doing
those chores altogether), this will reduce the minimum returns to education needed to be
educated, increasing the share of the girls who are educated. We view this as negotiation
skills expanding the effective efficient frontier (from the point of view of parents and their
daughters) and thus moving household investments closer to the true efficient frontier.
Increasing R˜di or R˜
p
i . If negotiation training increases either parents’ beliefs about the
returns to education or the true returns of education (as a complementary, non-cognitive
input), R˜pi , this would move girls on the margin of the threshold returns to education needed
to be educated (as perceived by the parent) above the threshold needed to be educated.
Increasing R˜di alone could also affect parents’ investment by affecting the set of girls willing
to compensate parents for their investments. Given that the information treatment had no
effect, we view information about the returns to education to be unlikely to be driving the
results, although negotiation girls may be more able to communicate the value of education
to their parents. Moreover, this does not rule out the possibility that parents perceived the
treatment itself as increasing the returns to education, which would increase the set of girls
whose returns to education are greater than the threshold even without affecting strategic
cooperation.
Increasing δ. If negotiation training led girls to use persuasive tactics to increase par-
ents’ other-regarding preferences (that is, to value their utility more), this would reduce the
minimum returns to education needed to be educated, increasing education levels. δ can
also be interpreted as a reduced-form representation of increasing the daughter’s bargaining
weight in the household, which will appear observationally equivalent to increased parental
altruism.
The first two mechanisms most closely align with the negotiation curriculum, which
emphasizes identifying gains from trade and finding solutions that make both parties better
off rather than pure persuasion. Both these two mechanisms move households closer to the
true efficient frontier. In contrast, increasing the returns to education expands the efficient
frontier. Still, ex ante, all these mechanisms are plausible, and in the next section, we use
both the results of the midline survey and the lab-in-the-field investment game to test for
evidence of each of these mechanisms.
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Lastly, the model is highly consistent with the heterogeneity indicated by the machine
learning exercise, which indicated that negotiation’s effects are greatest among girls whose
ability puts them on the margin of being educated. Assuming ability is positively related to
the returns to education, our model tells us that changing any of these components should
affect higher ability girls (e.g. those with returns to education right below R∗∗i ). Thus, from
the model and consistent with the machine learning, negotiation increases education among
the group where the efficiency gains are the highest by increasing education among girls for
whom the returns to schooling are relatively high.30
5.2 Effects of Negotiation Within the Household: The Midline
Survey
Table 7 reports the effect of negotiation on girls’ and parents’ behavior within the house-
hold in the midline survey. It provides evidence in favor of two of the mechanisms for the
negotiation effect in the model – strategic cooperation between parents and girls and the
reduction of the effective cost of education. Additionally, the survey assists in ruling out
alternative mechanisms and effects of the treatment, including that the treatment affected
parents’ perceptions of girls in a negative way, that parents either increased their estimation
of girls’ abilities or better aligned these expectations with true ability, and that girls own
desire for education was increased due to a change in the returns to education.
Columns 1 and 2 provide suggestive evidence for the first mechanism – that negotiation
fostered strategic cooperation between parents and daughters, leading daughters to ask for
more investment and to reciprocate in return. Column 1 reports that negotiation girls were
7.7 percentage points more likely to ask for food,31 while column 2 indicates that parents
were 3.7 percentage points less likely to report it was difficult to get negotiation girls to do
chores, although the effect is only marginally significant.
Columns 3-6 provide evidence in favor of our second mechanism – that negotiation allowed
households to find less costly ways to make educational investments. Columns 3-5 provide
suggestive (if mostly statistically insignificant) evidence that negotiation girls spend less time
on chores (measured in hours) before and during school hours and more time on chores after
school. In column 6, we exploit the fact that girls were asked how many hours they spent on
chores on the last weekday when they were surveyed, introducing random variation in the
30To verify that this interpretation of the heterogeneous effects is not confounded by an alternative,
plausible interpretation – that higher ability girls were better able to learn negotiation skills – we regress
knowledge of negotiation on receiving the negotiation training interacted with variables for high and low
ability. Appendix Table A7 reports these results and provides evidence that low and high ability girls did
not differ in their ability to learn negotiation skills.
31Conversations with our negotiation coaches confirm that hunger was a major issue for adolescent females
in Lusaka.
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day about which they were asked. We find that negotiation girls spend more hours doing
chores on Fridays and less time doing chores on other week days than other girls. Since
Friday is the day girls least need to do homework or study for exams, this suggests that
negotiation girls are able to allocate time spent on chores to times when school work has
lower returns.
In columns 7-9, we test whether negotiation affected girls behavior in other ways that
might affect parents’ views of daughters. Columns 7 and 8 show that parents are no more
likely to report that a girl has difficulty controlling her temper (indicator variable) or is
rude (1–4 scale), and according to column 9, parents of girls in the negotiation treatment
are significantly more likely to report that girls are respectful (1–4 scale), which is also
consistent with the hypothesis that negotiation increased daughters’ ability to reciprocate
their parents’ investments. Altogether, this set of results indicates that negotiation did
not negatively affect girls’ relationships with their parents – one of our key concerns when
we designed the curriculum. Instead, column 9 indicates that negotiation may have even
strengthened these relationships.
In columns 10-12, we consider the possibility that negotiation affected parents’ or daugh-
ters’ perceptions of daughters’ abilities. Negotiation skills may have led parents to believe
that daughters were higher ability, incentivizing them to invest in the treated daughters,
consistent with the idea that it may have increased the perceived returns to education in the
model, or these skills may have allowed daughters to inform parents about their ability.32 To
test for these two possibilities, we regress the parent’s 1-5 rating of the daughter’s ability rel-
ative to her classmates on negotiation (column 10) and the interaction between negotiation
and the ability factor (column 11). In column 10, we see that negotiation has no effect on
parents’ perceptions, and in column 11, we find that negotiation does not lead a daughter’s
measured ability to be more correlated with the parent’s perception of her ability. Thus,
we find no evidence that negotiation changed parents’ perceptions of daughters’ abilities or
provided them with more information on daughters’ abilities. Finally, in column 12, we
regress the number of years of schooling a daughter reported wanting to complete on the
treatment. If negotiation increased a daughter’s perceived returns to education, including
by actually increasing her real returns to education, negotiation should positively affect the
number of years of school a daughter wants to complete. We see no evidence that this is the
case.
32This would reduce the misallocation of schooling investments, as in Dizon-Ross (2016).
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5.3 Effect of Negotiation in a Controlled Environment: The Lab-
in-the-Field Experiment
While the midline survey provides suggestive evidence on how girls used their negotiation
skills within the household, the lab-in-the-field experiment was designed to simulate parents’
educational investment decision-making and provide a controlled environment in which to
isolate the different mechanisms outlined in the model.
Girls were randomly assigned to one of three variations of the game:33 a basic “dictator”
game, an “investment” game, and an investment game with the opportunity for communi-
cation. The investment game with the opportunity for communication, similar in protocol
to a “trust game” that is often used in lab experiments, is designed to most closely mirror
the everyday household interactions that could lead girls to receive increased human capital
investments (whether time to do homework, money for school fees, or other forms of parental
support). In both versions of the investment game, parents were endowed with ten tokens,
that either could be redeemed for cell phone air time, which is fungible and serves as pseudo
currency for survey compensation, or sent to daughters. Any tokens sent to daughters would
be doubled, combined with a random income shock of 2 or 4 tokens, and then given to
daughters, who could then choose how many tokens to send back to parents and redeem the
remainder for prizes, as described below. The amount of the income shock was not revealed
to the girls, and served two purposes. First, it allowed parents to make their decision about
what to send with incomplete monitoring by the girls, reducing contractibility. Second, as
we discuss in more detail later, it provides exogenous variation in a girl’s number of to-
kens received, which will allow us to identify unbiased estimates of the effect of negotiation
on reciprocity by daughters. In the communication variant, after parents and girls learned
these rules, but before tokens were sent, they were given the opportunity to communicate.
This opportunity was provided by having the surveyors implementing the game pause and
allow the girl and guardian to meet before returning to their “stations” to make their de-
cisions privately. Parents and girls were not required to communicate, and in many cases,
no information was shared. This mirrors the fact that, in the real world, girls can choose
to communicate with their guardians if they wish, and that negotiation skills may aid in
initiating these communications.
In the “dictator” variation of the game, the protocol was the same, except girls did not
return any tokens to their parents, and there was no communication. This variant was
designed to measure whether the treatment impacted parental altruism, δ, toward girls (or
33Because lab experiments typically require a smaller sample than field experiments for sufficient power,
and we did not want to confuse girls or their guardians by playing multiple versions, we divided our sample
among the three versions.
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the girls’ bargaining weight within the household, which is not observationally separable
from altruism), since there was no direct return to parents themselves from sending tokens
to their daughters.
In contrast to the dictator game, the number of tokens parents sent in the investment
version of the game depended on parents’ expectation of how many tokens daughters would
return, or daughters’ reciprocity, τ . Thus, by estimating the effects of negotiation on the
number of tokens parents sent, we can estimate how negotiation affected parents’ expecta-
tions of daughters’ reciprocity. Additionally, by administering this version of the game with
and without communication, we can isolate the effect of the girls’ negotiation skills them-
selves – which they are able to use in the communication version of the game – on expected
reciprocity. Because parents’ expectations about the number of tokens daughters will return
could have been influenced in multiple ways by the treatment, as we discuss more below,
we do not have clear predictions about the effect of negotiation on the number of tokens
parents will send when communication is not possible. However, if treated girls were able to
use their negotiation skills to increase expected reciprocity, this would manifest as a strong
positive interaction between the communication variant and the negotiation treatment.
The investment game with communication closely aligns with the theoretical framework,
where increased reciprocity by daughters allows parents and daughters to move closer to the
efficient frontier in educational investment. In the standard investment game, it is efficient
for parents to send all their tokens to their daughters since there is a high, certain rate of
return from investment (100%). If parents could contract with their daughters, they would
achieve this outcome. In fact, households are far from the efficient frontier: the average
parent sent half her tokens to her daughter in the investment game. Only 2.4% sent all their
tokens. Thus, just as in the theoretical framework, strategic cooperation could lead to more
efficient outcomes in the context of the game. If a treatment increases the number of tokens
that a parent sends, it mechanically increases the total number of tokens available, moving
the household toward the efficient frontier.
There was one additional cross-randomized variation of the game. For a subset of girls,
the tokens sent to girls were only doubled if they successfully completed a word search.
This was intended to allow the returns to parental investment to vary based on daughters’
ability (allowing R˜pi to affect the investment decision).
34 However, parents’ investments did
not respond to the potential variation created by the word game, and so we pool it with
other versions for our main analyses. Altogether, a total of 333 girls participated in the
34This maps onto the possibility that parents are uncertain about the returns to education or their child’s
ability, leading them to under-invest in the child. Therefore, this variation tests for another mechanism
through which negotiation could increase parents’ educational investments in their children – allowing the
child to increase parents’ perceptions of her ability.
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dictator game, 682 girls participated in the investment game without communication, and
647 participated in the investment game with communication. Appendix Table A8 reports
the number of girls assigned to each variation.35
Unlike in typical lab games, which are played by strangers, the results of a game between
daughters and parents could easily be undone after the game if daughters received cash.
To solve this problem, daughters redeemed their tokens for prizes at a “store” (a table in
the game room), displaying and selling girl-specific items that parents would not value for
themselves, including consumption items (e.g., hair bands, candy), school supplies (e.g.,
pencils, notebooks), and personal items (e.g., socks, menstrual pads). Appendix Figure A3
shows the store and the prizes. Parents had no control over how daughters spent the tokens,
though we acknowledge that resource allocations from the game might still be undone ex post
since parents can control daughters’ later consumption. However, parents at least believe
that a portion of the allocation is binding (or requires some cost to undo), since otherwise
they would pursue the fully efficient allocation of sending 100% of tokens instead of 50%.
To confirm that the game is perceived as having real stakes, and that it has explanatory
power for real-world outcomes, in Appendix Table A9, we regress the human capital index
on the number of tokens parents sent. We do not find a significant connection between
tokens sent in the dictator game and real-world investment (although this may be due to
a lack of power, as the coefficient is similar to the coefficient for the investment game),
but we do find a significant relationship between tokens sent in the investment game and
real-world investment. Moreover, we find that this connection is most strongly driven by
the communication variant of the game, affirming our view that this version most closely
mirrors the real-world setting in which parents make investment decisions.
5.3.1 Results
This section reports the results from the investment games. Our main regressions take the
form
yi = β0 + β1negotiationi + β2safe spacei + β3communicationi
+ β4negotiationi × communicationi + β5safespacei × communicationi
+ ΓXi + i, (3)
35These numbers differ slightly from the sample sizes in our regressions since data entry and non-response
for control variables lead some observations to be missing in the regressions.
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where yi is the outcome of interest, negotiationi is an indicator variable for the negotiation
treatment, safe spacei is an indicator variable for the safe space treatment, communicationi
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if girls were allowed to communicate with their parents,
and Xi is our standard set of controls. As before, since randomization took place within
schools, all the regressions control for school fixed effects, and we control for ethnicity fixed
effects and a rich set of controls for socioeconomic status.
Tokens Sent to Daughter. Table 8 reports the effect of negotiation on the number of to-
kens parents sent to their daughters. Column 1 reports the results from the dictator game
alone, which aims to isolate the altruism channel. We find that neither negotiation nor safe
space had a statistically significant effect on the number of tokens that parents sent to their
daughters. Column 2 estimates the effects of negotiation and safe space for the investment
game sample. Again, negotiation and safe space have no significant effects on the number of
tokens sent. These columns suggest that the negotiation treatment did not generally affect
parents’ altruism toward their daughters.
In column 3, we allow the effect of communication to interact with negotiation and
safe space. Column 3 shows that communication and negotiation have a strong, positive
interaction. When girls with negotiation skills are allowed to communicate, they receive 0.785
more tokens than when they are not. The interaction between safe space and communication
(0.450) is half the size. On the other hand, in the non-communication version of the game,
girls in the negotiation and safe space treatments received 0.469 and 0.397 fewer tokens, a
result which we discuss in more detail below. When we combine these coefficients, we find
that among girls who were allowed to communicate, girls in the negotiation treatment receive
a marginally significant 0.316 more tokens than control girls, while girls in the safe space
treatment receive almost exactly the same number of tokens as the control girls. Appendix
Figure A4 graphs the density of tokens sent by parents when daughters are and are not
allowed to communicate for the safe space, negotiation, and control girls. Consistent with
the results from the regressions, in the game with communication, the distribution of tokens
sent for safe space and control girls is almost identical, while the density of tokens sent for
negotiation girls is lower in the middle and fatter in the upper tail relative to the game
without communication.
The results in column 3 suggest that parents believe that girls in the negotiation treatment
are more reciprocal than control girls when they are allowed to communicate.36 This suggests
that, when daughters can communicate and therefore, specifically use their negotiation skills,
36We cannot rule out an alternate explanation for this finding, which is that while the returns to investment
in terms of tokens are known, negotiation girls who are allowed to communicate transmit information about
the subjective returns to the items they could buy at the store. For example, a girl might tell her parents that
she really needs pencils or notebooks for school. This mechanism maps onto theoretical work on Bayesian
persuasion by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
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they affect parents’ expectations of reciprocity. The fact that communication is needed for
negotiation to positively affect parents’ behavior provides further evidence that negotiation
skills themselves matter rather than other aspects of the treatment. The findings in the
communication version of the game also provide evidence that fostering strategic cooperation
(affecting τ in the theoretical framework), rather than merely affecting parental altruism or
bargaining weights, is an important element of the effect of the negotiation treatment on girls’
outcomes. Indeed, these results show that – when communication is possible – negotiation
(marginally significantly) led to more efficient outcomes in the investment game, and that
the interaction between the negotiation treatment and the opportunity to communicate is
strongly positive and significant.
Column 4 reports the average effect of the word game, and shows that the word game
variation had no impact on parental giving. We therefore pool the word game with the other
treatments in most specifications.37
Why did parents send fewer tokens in the game without communication in both the
negotiation and safe space treatments? We can speculate that this effect reflects the fact that
the female empowerment elements of the negotiation and safe space treatments led parents
to expect less reciprocity from the girls in the absence of communication. That is, they
expected that the girls would spend more tokens on themselves.38 However, when negotiation
girls could communicate, they were able to use their negotiation skills to increase parents’
expectations of reciprocity, leading them to receive more tokens. We further explore this
hypothesis later in this section. Importantly, while the results without communication are
similar between the negotiation and safe space treatments, the results with communication
are different (albeit marginally significantly so), indicating that the negotiation treatment
specifically affected girls’ ability to communicate reciprocity.
To verify that the negotiation skills themselves play an important role in increasing the
number of tokens daughters are sent when daughters can communicate, we next include the
girl’s total score on the knowledge of negotiation test and its interaction with the commu-
nication treatment in the regressions (Appendix Table A11). We find that knowledge has
no effect when girls are not allowed to communicate, but when girls are allowed to commu-
nicate, those with more knowledge are sent significantly more tokens, even controlling for
the interaction of the negotiation treatment with communication. This is again consistent
with negotiation girls specifically using their negotiation skills when they were allowed to
communicate with their parents.
37In Appendix Table A10, we further test whether the word game interacts with safe space, communication,
or negotiation in meaningful ways. In all three cases, we see little evidence that the word game interacted
with the treatments to affect investment decisions.
38This hypothesis is consistent with Angelucci and Garlick (2016), who show that more traditional house-
holds exhibit more efficient decision-making than less traditional households in Mexico.
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Tokens Returned to the Parent. Our findings in Table 8 suggest that negotiation girls may
have been sent more tokens because they were able to increase parents’ expectations of
reciprocity (by committing to send them back more tokens) when they were allowed to com-
municate. If this is the case, and parents have rational expectations, girls in the negotiation
× communication cell should be more likely to send parents back a marginal token. We now
explicitly test whether this is the case. Since the number of tokens a girl receives is endoge-
nous, we cannot simply regress the number of tokens a daughter sends back to her parent on
the number of tokens that she receives to estimate the pass-through of the marginal token
sent to a daughter to her parent. Instead, we take advantage of the fact that daughters
received a random income shock of two or four tokens before deciding how many tokens to
send to their parents. We can use this random shock to estimate the pass-through of an
additional token sent to the daughter to the parent with the following regression
tokens returnedi = β0 + β1negotiationi + β2safe spacei + β3communicationi
+ β4negotiationi × communicationi + β5safe spacei × communicationi
+ β6shocki + β7shocki × negotiationi × communicationi
+ +β8negotiationi × shocki + β9communicationi × shocki + αt
+ αs + ΓXi + i,
where i denotes a daughter, tokens returnedi is the number of tokens a daughter sends her
parent, shocki takes the value of the shock to the number of tokens the daughter received (2
or 4), αt is a fixed effect for the number of tokens parents sent daughters, and negotiationi
safe spacei, communicationi, and Xi are defined in the same way as before. Then β7, the
relative increase in the pass-through of the marginal token given to a daughter to the parent
in the negotiation treatment and the communication variant of the game, is one of our key
coefficients of interest.
Column 1 of Table 9 reports the results of this regression. We estimate that β7 is 0.464,
consistent with the idea that girls who received the negotiation treatment and communicated
with their parents were more likely to transfer an additional token back to their parents. In
column 2, we include an analogous set of interactions between communicationi, shocki, and
safe spacei. We find that the coefficient of communicationi × safe spacei × num tokensi
is less than one-third the size of β7 and statistically insignificant.
Using the coefficients from Table 9, in the bottom panel of the table, we calculate what
fraction of an additional token parents should expect to receive when a girl in the negotiation,
safe space, or control treatment who is allowed to communicate receives an additional token
based on our coefficient estimates. Control and safe space girls pass-through about one-fifth
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of a token. In contrast, negotiation girls pass through one-half of an additional token. While
we do not have enough statistical power to rule out the possibility that the overall pass-
through rate when communication is allowed is the same for both safe space and negotiation
girls, the pattern of the point estimates is consistent with the idea that negotiation (in the
presence of communication) increases parental investment by increasing the expectation of
reciprocity (τ). Interestingly, in the non-communication treatment, both negotiation and
safe space girls have a lower (albeit not statistically significantly different) pass-through
rate, consistent with the idea that these treatments partly empowered girls to look after
their own interests. This also suggests that girls in the negotiation treatment playing the
communication game aligned their behavior to be consistent with their communication to
their parents about reciprocity.
Daughter’s Welfare. Next, in Appendix Table A12, we investigate whether negotiation
made daughters better off in the investment game. The regressions in Appendix Table A12
duplicate the specifications in columns 2-4 of Table 8, but the outcome variable is now the
final number of tokens that the daughter finishes the game with, which is tokens sent (plus
random income shock) minus tokens returned. The results in Appendix Table A12 echo
those in Table 8. Column 1 suggests that girls in the negotiation and safe space treatments
end the game with no more tokens on average (and perhaps fewer in the case of safe space),
but column 2 shows that this masks important heterogeneity. Girls who received the safe
space and negotiation treatments and were not allowed to communicate with their parents
end the game with marginally significantly fewer tokens, consistent with column 5 of Table
8. Negotiation girls who were allowed to communicate with their parents end the game
with 0.954 more tokens than girls who could not communicate. Moreover, among girls who
were allowed to communicate, negotiation girls end the game with 0.417 more tokens than
control girls, while safe space girls end the game with 0.285 fewer tokens. The estimates
are consistent with the idea that negotiation – with communication – not only increased the
total size of the surplus (by increasing the number of tokens sent) but also provides some
evidence that it increased girls’ welfare.39
Figure 3 visually confirms that this is the case. The figure plots the density of parent-
child pairs by percent of total potential tokens received by the guardian and the daughter.
The red, diagonal line plots the efficient frontier. Outcomes closer to this line are nearer to
the efficient frontier, while outcomes in the top left of the picture are better for daughters.
The figure is consistent with communication leading to outcomes that are both better for
daughters and closer to the frontier among negotiation girls.
39As in Table 8, the word game has no significant effect on the number of tokens daughters received (see
column 3).
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How Girls Spent the Tokens. Finally, in Appendix Table A13, we estimate the effects of
the different treatments and their interactions with the communication treatment on how
girls spent the tokens. We aggregate total spending into three broad categories: school sup-
plies (colored pens, math books, notebooks, pencils, erasers, rulers, and pencil sharpeners);
personal household items, consisting of socks and sanitary pads; and pure consumption (hair
ties, scarves, bracelets, lip balm, snacks, and snakes and ladders games). We speculate that
girls exhibiting more empowered behavior, without the strategic reciprocity balancing it out,
may exhibit more “me-first” expenditures. Consistent with this, negotiation and safe space
girls spend more in magnitude (and sometimes significantly more) on pure consumption rela-
tive to control girls in both the non-communication investment and dictator games (columns
3 and 9). However, when negotiation girls are allowed to communicate with their parents,
they spend less on pure consumption (column 9) and more on personal items that are useful
for the household (column 8). These results provide further suggestive evidence that the
communication game allows strategic cooperation between parents and girls in the negotia-
tion treatment. They are able to credibly communicate their intentions to both return more
tokens and spend tokens in a more household-oriented way.
Putting the results together from this and the previous subsection, we find evidence
that negotiation affected τ¯ , increasing reciprocity and strategic cooperation in the household
and moving human capital investments closer to the efficient frontier. This is evidenced
both by the reciprocity in the midline survey – girls are more respectful and it is easier to
get them to do chores, but they ask for more food – and the results from the investment
game, which suggest that negotiation girls achieved more efficient outcomes when they could
communicate. Additionally, we find evidence that negotiation affected f˜ by allowing girls to
negotiate with their parents to move their chores so that they could study or attend school
at times when doing so was most effective, again moving households closer to the efficient
frontier.
6 Evidence on Spillovers
While negotiation made the treated girls better off, if parents have limited resources to invest
in education, it may have made untreated children worse off. Similarly, the negotiation
treatment could have led teachers to devote more resources to treated girls at the expense
of their classmates or led parents to reallocate investments within the household (Das et al.,
2013). The design of our experiment only allows for suggestive evidence on the presence
of spillovers, because the characteristics of the pure control and treatment schools were not
fully balanced and because we did not collect administrative data on siblings’ outcomes.
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However, we are able to provide some evidence on spillovers using three different methods.
First, we use propensity score matching to match the pure control and treated students and
estimate the effects of being in a treatment school on the administrative outcomes of the girls
in the control group.40 Second, we use data on grade 9 male dropout rates in the Zambian
school census from 2001-2014 and a difference-in-differences methodology to estimate the
effect of being a treated school in 2014 on male dropout.41 Finally, we estimate the effects
of negotiation on siblings’ outcomes that were reported by parents in the midline to see if
parents treat siblings differently or expect them to finish fewer years of schooling.
Table 10 reports the results of these tests. Columns 1 and 2 report the effect of being
in a treated school on the control girls. In both cases, we find no significant spillovers.
Column 3 reports the effect of being a negotiation school on male dropout rates from the
difference-in-differences regression and again, the effect is small and insignificant.
The remaining columns of Table 10 estimate the effect of negotiation on parents’ responses
to questions about the closest male and female sibling in age to the treated girl in the midline.
Parents were given 20 tokens that represented their resources and were asked how they would
divide them between the treated girl, her female sibling, and her male sibling. In column 4,
the outcome is the number of tokens the parent allocated to the male sibling, and in column
5, it is the number she or he allocated to the female sibling. In both cases, negotiation had no
effect on the allocation of the tokens. Parents were then asked how much time the male and
female sibling spent doing chores and spent doing school work on the last weekday. Columns
6, 7, and 8 show that negotiation had no effect on the time the siblings spent doing chores
and did not affect the amount of time the male sibling spent doing school work. Column 9
shows that negotiation had a marginally significant, positive effect on the amount of time
the female sibling spent doing school work. Parents were also asked if, after the intervention,
they were more likely to pay girls’ school fees relative to boys. In column 9, we do find that
negotiation significantly increased the likelihood that they answered “yes” to this question.
Finally, parents were asked, given the obstacles they faced, how many years of schooling
they expected the male and female sibling to complete. Columns 11 and 12 reveal that the
negotiation treatment had no effect on the number of years parents expected the siblings
to complete. In Appendix Table A14, motivated by our stronger treatment effects on high
40Since pregnancy and enrollment were not collected in the pure control schools after term 2 of grade
9, we only look at these outcomes before term 2 of grade 9. Additionally, since attendance data is not
typically collected by schools outside of the context of the study, the collection of the data for this project
was extremely heterogeneous across schools. In fact, missing attendance data at the school-level is not
balanced between the pure control and treated schools. For these reasons, we do not include the attendance
measure in these regressions, where we cannot control for school fixed effects. In contrast, other measures,
such as fee payment and national exam scores, are typically collected administratively by schools and are
rarely missing.
41We regress school-year level 9th grade male dropout rates for the universe of Zambian junior secondary
schools on school and year fixed effects, and an indicator variable set to equal 1 if a school was a program
school in 2014. Standard errors are clustered at the school-level.
35
ability girls, we further check for differential spillovers on the siblings of high ability versus
low ability girls and find no evidence of heterogeneous effects.
Overall, these results suggest that the negotiation program did not have strong negative
spillovers on either the treated girls’ siblings or their classmates. We only find evidence
of spillovers on two outcomes (time spent on school work and whether parents would pay
boys’ school fees), and in the school work case, the spillover is positive. While parents
reported they were relatively less likely to pay boys’ school fees over girls’, parents did not
expect male siblings to complete fewer years of schooling. While it may seem surprising that
increased educational investment in the treated girl did not negatively affect her siblings,
this could be because the increased investment came out of parents’ consumption or because
girls used negotiation to arrive at solutions that increased family welfare, consistent with the
theoretical framework.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effect of non-cognitive, interpersonal skills on female education in
Zambia, a context where – as in much of sub-Saharan Africa – female secondary school en-
rollment is low. To study the effects of negotiation, we provided a randomly chosen group of
Zambian 8th graders with negotiation skills training, as well as two alternative treatments –
information and safe space – which isolate potential ways through which the training could
affect educational outcomes. Then, to understand how negotiation can affect girls’ out-
comes, we invited the girls to participate with a parent in a lab-in-the-field investment game
that simulates the educational investment decision in a setting where there is incomplete
contracting between parents and children and to take part in a midline survey.
We find that negotiation skills increase educational investment despite the fact that they
do not relieve households’ financial constraints, particularly for higher ability girls who are
likely on the margin of enrolling in and completing secondary school. Running a horse-race
between negotiation and our alternative treatments suggests that neither the aspirations
or mentorship effects of the negotiation treatment nor information about the returns to
education explain the full negotiation effect. Instead, the results of our investment game
and midline survey suggest that negotiation girls increased their education by strategically
cooperating with parents, reciprocating their educational investments, and by moving the
timing of chores to conflict less with school work and studying, reducing the effective costs of
education. We find evidence that parents find it easier to get negotiation girls to do chores
and view these girls as more respectful, although girls ask for more food, and we also find
evidence that negotiation girls shift their chores to Fridays when studying is less valuable.
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Both these mechanisms move educational investment closer to the efficient frontier.
Our paper adds to an important literature on intra-household bargaining. This literature
has largely focused on bargaining problems between spouses, but bargaining between parents
and children over human capital investment is just as important given the potentially high
returns to education (Duflo, 2001). In standard spousal bargaining models such as Chiappori
(1992), the efficient action is always undertaken and spouses merely bargain over the surplus.
In contrast, when imperfectly altruistic parents make human capital investment decisions
for children who cannot commit to repay them, the efficient outcome may not be achieved
(Banerjee, 2004; Becker et al., 2016; Ashraf et al., 2016; Bau, 2016). Therefore, negotiation
skills can play an important role by helping parents and children achieve a more efficient,
pareto-improving outcome. Indeed, we speculate that these skills could also facilitate more
efficient decisions when there are incomplete contracting problems between spouses (as may
be the case in Udry (1996)).
Additionally, this paper complements the growing literature on how non-cognitive skills
improve long-term outcomes. We provide – to our knowledge – the first estimates of the
educational returns to a specific type of non-cognitive skill, negotiation skills. By focusing
on interpersonal skills, which develop in adolescence (Choudhury et al., 2006), instead of
other non-cognitive skills, which are typically best influenced when children are very young,
we discover an opportunity to influence non-cognitive skills in the school system. Since it is
arguably easier to intervene within schools than within households, this finding may inform
policies that aim to increase students’ non-cognitive skills.
Going back to Nash’s seminal paper on bargaining, one of the clearest ways to increase
an individual’s share in the bargaining surplus is to increase that individual’s outside option
if bargaining breaks down (Nash, 1950). However, increasing a child’s outside option may be
impossible. In contrast, if a household is not at the efficient frontier, and the parental human
capital investment decision is not a zero-sum game, then there is an opportunity to increase
a daughter’s welfare (and her parents’) without necessarily improving the daughter’s outside
option. Guided by relational contracting models (for example, Chassang (2010)), we show
that this is the case, providing evidence both that there is a policy opportunity to facilitate
welfare-improving human capital investments and that teaching girls negotiation skills can
help achieve this outcome.
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Figures
Figure 1: Experimental Timeline
This figure details the timeline for the baseline data collection, the initiation of the experi-
ment, the midline data collection and the investment game, and the subsequent three years
of administrative data collection.
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Figure 2: Estimates of the Effect of Negotiation on Human Capital
This figure reports the estimates of the coefficient of the negotiation effect (relative to the
control) on different human capital outcomes. The estimates are the same estimates as those
reported in Table 3. “AES” refers to the average effect size coefficient, “HCI Index” refers
to the human capital index, “Zero Balance” refers to having a zero balance for school fees
at the end of 9th grade, “Took Exam” refers to taking the national exam, “Attendance”
refers to average attendance conditional on being enrolled in school in 8th and 9th grade,
“Enrollment” refers to the average enrollment rate, and “Math” and “English” refer to
scoring in the top 25th percentile in these subjects on the national exam at the end of 9th
grade. The vertical bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Parent-Child Outcomes and Distance to the Efficient Frontier for
Negotiation Girls With and Without Communication
This figure simultaneously plots the percent of the potential total number of tokens a household
(daughter plus guardian) received (distance from the efficient frontier) and the allocation of tokens
at the end of the investment game between parents and daughters for girls in the negotiation
treatment in the non-communication variant of the game (top graph) and the communication
variant (bottom graph). The darkness of the color indicates how many observations have a given
allocation between the daughter and her parent for a given percent of the total potential tokens
acquired. The total number of potential tokens is the number of tokens the household would receive
if a parent sent all her tokens to the daughter (22 or 24 depending on the income shock). Households
are on the efficient frontier if the household received all the tokens (on the diagonal line). Daughters
are better off if the allocation is to the left, indicating daughters ended the game with more tokens.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics and Balance of Characteristics by Negotiation Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean SD Coeff. (Neg vs Control) SE Coeff. (Neg vs. SS) SE Coeff. (SS vs Control) SE N
Both Parents Alive 0.737 0.440 -0.018 0.023 -0.019 0.023 -0.005 0.023 2,254
Live With Bio Dad 0.548 0.498 -0.018 0.025 -0.009 0.026 -0.008 0.026 2,254
Live With Bio Mom 0.701 0.458 0.011 0.023 0.008 0.023 0.003 0.024 2,254
Live With Mom and Dad 0.499 0.500 -0.021 0.025 -0.012 0.026 -0.009 0.026 2,254
Parents Pay Fees at Baseline 0.763 0.425 0.032 0.022 0.015 0.021 0.018 0.022 2,249
Read Nyanja Excellently 0.399 0.490 -0.045** 0.025 -0.048** 0.025 0.004 0.025 2,254
Speak Nyanja Excellently 0.480 0.500 -0.056** 0.025 -0.039 0.025 -0.014 0.025 2,254
Read English Excellently 0.697 0.459 -0.019 0.023 -0.025 0.023 0.009 0.023 2,254
Speak English Excellently 0.412 0.492 -0.049** 0.025 -0.002 0.025 -0.042 0.025 2,254
Age 14.419 1.461 0.052 0.073 0.033 0.073 0.012 0.073 2,254
Read Nyanja Well 0.637 0.481 -0.029 0.024 -0.002 0.025 -0.026 0.025 2,254
Speak Nyanja Well 0.885 0.320 -0.002 0.016 -0.006 0.016 -0.001 0.016 2,254
Read English Well 0.899 0.301 -0.010 0.015 -0.003 0.016 -0.007 0.015 2,254
Speak English Well 0.789 0.408 -0.021 0.021 -0.025 0.021 0.002 0.020 2,254
P-value (joint test) 0.457 0.550 0.923
This table reports summary statistics collected during the baseline survey for the girls from the 29 treatment schools who participated in the exper-
iment, as well as tests of the within-school randomization of the negotiation and safe space treatments relative to one another and the control. For
the coefficient column, each row is a regression of a child/household characteristic on a indicator for whether the girl was included in the negotiation
treatment, controlling for school fixed effects. The final row regresses indicator variables for negotiation (columns 3 and 5) or safe space (column 7)
on the full set of covariates and school fixed effects using a sample of either negotiation and control girls (column 3), negotiation and safe space girls
(column 5), or safe space and control girls (column 7), and reports the p-value from a joint test of the significance of the covariates. Standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust. * denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table 2: Hazard Model of the Effect of Negotiation on Dropout
(1) (2)
Dropout Dropout
Negotiation 0.896** 0.900**
(0.050) (0.048)
Percent Control Eventually Dropout 0.587 0.594
Controls Full Parsimonious
Number of observations 6,174 6,524
Clusters 1,429 1,508
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.007
This table reports estimates of the effect of negotiation on
dropout in Cox hazard regressions. Coefficients are reported as
hazard ratios. The full controls consist of controls for ethnicity
fixed effects, both parents being alive, living with one’s biological
father, living with one’s biological mother, living with both par-
ents, parents paying school fees at baseline, and indicator vari-
ables for whether a girl reads and speaks Nyanja and English ex-
cellently or well, as well as a control for whether a girl received
the information treatment and school fixed effects. The parsi-
monious controls only include controls for whether a girl reads
or speaks Nyanja excellently and whether she speaks English ex-
cellently, school fixed effects, and the control for the information
treatment. The standard errors allow interdependence over ob-
servations for the same individual by clustering at the individual
level. * denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes
1%.
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Table 3: Effect of Negotiation Relative to Control on Outcomes in Administrative Data
Panel A. Human Capital Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Human Capital Human Capital Paid All Took National Threshold Threshold Attendance Enrollment
Index AES Fees Exam Math English Rate Rate
Negotiation 0.059** 0.066*** 0.011 0.018 0.036 0.028 0.009* 0.027**
(0.026) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.026) (0.023) (0.005) (0.011)
SD 0.024 0.061 0.086 0.066 0.061* 0.097**
Control Mean -0.010 0.675 0.897 0.215 0.227 0.534 0.709
Number of Observations 1,388 1,404 1,422 1,422 1,422 1,419 1,429
Adjusted R2 0.043 -0.002 0.012 0.006 0.073 0.015 0.038
Panel B. Full Index and Pregnancy
(1) (2) (3)
Full Full Ever
Index AES Pregnant
Negotiation 0.056** 0.064*** -0.010
(0.027) (0.018) (0.010)
SD -0.053
Control Mean -0.010 0.036
Number of observations 1,388 1,429
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.020
This table reports estimates of the effect of the negotiation relative to the control girl in the treated schools on outcomes collected in the administrative
data. Estimates are reported both in the natural units of the data and in terms of standard deviations of the control group, so that the effects are in the
same units as the average effect sizes. Panel A: In column 1, the outcome is a human capital index constructed by standardizing each of the outcomes in
columns 3-8 and taking their average. In column 2, the effect sizes are the average effect sizes of the effects from columns 3-8. In column 3, the outcome is
an indicator variable equal to 1 if parents paid 9th grade school fees and 0 otherwise. In column 4, the outcome is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
student took the national exam at the end of grade 9. In column 5, the outcome is 1 if the student received greater than the 75th percentile on the national
exam in math and 0 otherwise and in column 6, it is the same for English. In column 7, the outcome is the students’ average post-treatment attendance rate
in grade 8 and terms 1 and 2 of grade 9. In column 8, the outcome is the student’s average enrollment rate in term 3 of grade 8 and terms 1 and 2 of grade
9. Panel B: In column 1, the outcome is the full index including the pregnancy dummy (with its sign flipped), and in column 2, it is the average effect
size including pregnancy. In column 3, the outcome is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student is ever observed to be pregnant in the post-treatment
period. All columns in both panels include controls for the information treatment, ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed effects, and socioeconomic controls,
consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with the biological father, lives with biological mother, lives with both mother and father, parents were
paying school fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja excellently, speaking Nyanja excellently, reading English excellently, speaking English excel-
lently, reading Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading English well, and speaking English well. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. * denotes
10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table 4: Robustness of Human Capital Average Effect Size
(1) (2)
Negotiation Coef. Se
Baseline 0.066*** 0.020
Parsimonious Controls 0.051*** 0.019
No Paid Fees 0.074*** 0.022
No Took National Exam 0.067*** 0.021
No Attendance 0.067*** 0.023
No Enrollment 0.060*** 0.022
No Math Threshold 0.062*** 0.020
No English Threshold 0.066*** 0.021
No Test Scores 0.061*** 0.021
This table reports estimates of the human capital
average effect size under different specifications, us-
ing the sample of negotiation and control girls in the
treated schools. Row 1 reports the baseline specifi-
cation from Table 3. Row 2 reports the results for
a specification that only controls for whether a girl
reads and speaks Nyanja excellently and whether she
speaks English excellently, as well as a control for
whether a girl received the information treatment
and school fixed effects. Row 3 reports the AES
omitting whether parents paid school fees as a com-
ponent. Row 4 omits taking the national examin,
row 5 omits attendance as a component, row 6 omits
enrollment, row 7 omits the math threshold, row 8
omits the English threshold, and row 9 omits both
test scores. * denotes 10% significance, ** denotes
5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table 5: Effect of Negotiation Relative to Safe Space and Information on Outcomes in
Administrative Data
Panel A. Human Capital Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Human Capital Human Capital Paid All Took National Threshold Threshold Attendance Enrollment
Index AES Fees Exam Math English Rate Rate
Negotiation 0.057** 0.062*** 0.012 0.017 0.035 0.025 0.008 0.026**
(0.026) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.026) (0.023) (0.005) (0.011)
SD 0.025 0.057 0.083 0.060 0.051 0.093**
Safe Space 0.018 0.021 0.002 0.011 0.005 -0.024 0.007 0.025*
(0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.013) (0.022) (0.018) (0.005) (0.012)
SD 0.005 0.035 0.012 -0.058 0.046 0.088*
Information -0.018 -0.017 -0.026 -0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.013
(0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.005) (0.010)
SD -0.055 -0.018 0.002 -0.007 0.020 -0.046
One-sided p-value (Neg vs SS) 0.073 0.015 0.308 0.361 0.110 0.005 0.448 0.459
One-sided p-value (Neg vs Info) 0.031 0.002 0.076 0.174 0.191 0.166 0.261 0.007
Control Mean -0.010 0.675 0.897 0.215 0.227 0.534 0.709
Number of Observations 2,059 2,082 2,112 2,112 2,112 2,107 2,122
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.004 0.016 0.003 0.056 0.015 0.037
Panel B. Full Index and Pregnancy
(1) (2) (3)
Full Full Ever
Index AES Pregnant
Negotiation 0.053* 0.060*** -0.009
(0.026) (0.018) (0.010)
SD -0.048
Safe Space 0.024 0.025 -0.009
(0.024) (0.017) (0.012)
SD -0.048
Information -0.016 -0.014 -0.002
(0.023) (0.015) (0.008)
SD -0.009
One-sided P-value (Neg vs SS) 0.140 0.023 0.497
One-sided P-value (Neg vs Info) 0.046 0.002 0.287
Control Mean -0.010 0.036
Number of Observations 2,059 2,122
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.017
This table reports estimates of the effect of the negotiation, safe space, and the information treatments in the treated schools on outcomes collected in the ad-
ministrative data. Estimates are reported both in the natural units of the data and in terms of standard deviations of the control group, so that the effects are
in the same units as the average effect sizes. Panel A: In column 1, the outcome is a human capital index constructed by standardizing each of the outcomes in
columns 3-8 and taking their average. In column 2, the effect sizes are the average effect sizes of the effects from columns 3-8. In column 3, the outcome is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if parents paid 9th grade school fees and 0 otherwise. In column 4, the outcome is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student took
the national exam at the end of grade 9. In column 5, the outcome is 1 if the student received greater than the 75th percentile on the national exam in math and
0 otherwise and in column 6, it is the same for English. In column 7, the outcome is the students’ average post-treatment attendance rate in grade 8 and terms
1 and 2 of grade 9. In column 8, the outcome is the student’s average enrollment rate in term 3 of grade 8 and terms 1 and 2 of grade 9. Panel B: In column
1, the outcome is the full index including the pregnancy dummy (with its sign flipped), and in column 2, it is the average effect size including pregnancy. In col-
umn 3, the outcome is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student is ever observed to be pregnant in the post-treatment period. All columns in both panels
include the information treatment, ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed effects, and socioeconomic controls, consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with
the biological father, lives with biological mother, lives with both mother and father, parents were paying school fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja
excellently, speaking Nyanja excellently, reading English excellently, speaking English excellently, reading Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading English well,
and speaking English well. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. * denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects of Negotiation by Ability
Panel A. Human Capital Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Human Capital Human Capital Paid All Took National Threshold Threshold Attendance Enrollment
Index AES Fees Exam Math English Rate Rate
Negotiation × High Ability 0.131** 0.166*** 0.020 0.071 0.049 0.067* 0.029** 0.063**
(0.061) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.038) (0.014) (0.028)
SD 0.043 0.236 0.117 0.159* 0.188** 0.228**
Negotiation × Low Ability 0.081* 0.080*** 0.020 0.060* 0.011 0.004 0.019* 0.031
(0.020) (0.031) (0.025) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.011) (0.020)
SD 0.042 0.200* 0.026 0.011 0.124* 0.011
Control Mean -0.018 0.693 0.864 0.532 0.711 0.211 0.220
Number of Observations 1,021 1,034 1,047 1,048 1,054 1,047 1,047
Adjusted R2 0.027 -0.002 0.014 0.021 0.023 -0.006 0.051
Panel B. Full Index and Pregnancy
(1) (2) (3)
Full Full Ever
Index AES Pregnant
Negotiation × High Ability 0.124*** 0.126*** -0.026
(0.060) (0.042) (0.027)
SD -0.133
Negotiation × Low Ability 0.081* 0.052 -0.018
(0.043) (0.034) (0.016)
SD -0.094
Control Mean -0.019 0.041
Number of Observations 1,021 1,054
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.030
This table reports estimates of the effect of the negotiation by whether or not girls’ ability factor is greater than 0.45 (the partitions of the treatment effect
indicated by the machine learning estimation) on outcomes collected in the administrative data. An ability factor above 0.45 corresponds to the top 40th
percentile of the ability distribution. The data set is a randomly chosen subsample of the full data which was held back and not used in the machine learning
that established partitions of the data. Estimates are reported both in the natural units of the data and in terms of standard deviations of the control group,
so that the effects are in the same units as the average effect sizes. Panel A: In column 1, the outcome is a human capital index constructed by standard-
izing each of the outcomes in columns 3-8 and taking their average. In column 2, the effect sizes are the average effect sizes of the effects from columns 3-8.
In column 3, the outcome is an indicator variable equal to 1 if parents paid 9th grade school fees and 0 otherwise. In column 4, the outcome is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the student took the national exam at the end of grade 9. In column 5, the outcome is 1 if the student received greater than the 75th
percentile on the national exam in math and 0 otherwise and in column 6, it is the same for English. In column 7, the outcome is the students’ average post-
treatment attendance rate in grade 8 and terms 1 and 2 of grade 9. In column 8, the outcome is the student’s average enrollment rate in term 3 of grade 8
and terms 1 and 2 of grade 9. Panel B: In column 1, the outcome is the full index including the pregnancy dummy (with its sign flipped), and in column 2,
it is the average effect size including pregnancy. In column 3, the outcome is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student is ever observed to be pregnant
in the post-treatment period. All columns in both panels include the information treatment, ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed effects, and socioeconomic
controls, consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with the biological father, lives with biological mother, lives with both mother and father, parents
were paying school fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja excellently, speaking Nyanja excellently, reading English excellently, speaking English ex-
cellently, reading Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading English well, and speaking English well. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. * denotes
10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table 8: Effect of Negotiation Treatment on Parents’ Behavior in the Investment and Dic-
tator Games
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tokens Sent Tokens Sent Tokens Sent Tokens Sent
DG Game IG Game IG Game IG Game
Communication × Negotiation 0.785*** 0.783***
(0.263) (0.263)
Communication × Safe Space 0.450* 0.445*
(0.263) (0.263)
Negotiation 0.390 -0.086 -0.469*** -0.467***
(0.275) (0.130) (0.180) (0.180)
Safe Space 0.271 -0.176 -0.397** -0.396**
(0.252) (0.131) (0.181) (0.181)
Communication -0.092 -0.087
(0.194) (0.194)
Word Game -0.099
(0.104)
Control Mean 4.949 5.362 5.362 5.362
Number of observations 297 1,224 1,224 1,224
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.019 0.033 0.033
Effects of Negotiation and Safe Space in the Communication Arm of the Experiment
Negotiation & Communication 0.316* 0.316*
(0.188) (0.188)
Safe Space & Communication 0.054 0.049
(0.186) (0.189)
One-sided Test (P-value) 0.079 0.075
This table reports the effects of the negotiation treatment on parents’ behavior in a lab-in-the-field
investment game. In the dictator game (DG, column 1), parents decided how many tokens to send
to their daughters and the tokens were doubled (plus a random component), but daughters did not
return tokens to their parents. In other versions of the game (IG), parents decided how many to-
kens to send to daughters, and tokens sent to daughters were doubled (plus a random component).
Daughters then decided how many tokens to return to guardians. In the communication treatment,
daughters were allowed to communicate with guardians before guardians sent the tokens. In the
word game treatment, the tokens were only doubled if the girl had found at least half the words in
a word game. Column 1 only includes girls who participated in the dictator game. The remaining
columns only include those who participated in the investment game. All columns include con-
trols for the information treatment, ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed effects, and socioeconomic
controls, consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with the biological father, lives with
the biological mother, lives with both mother and father, parents were paying school fees in the
pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja excellently, speaking Nyanja excellently, reading English ex-
cellently, speaking English excellently, reading Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading English
well, and speaking English well. The bottom panel reports the net effect of being in the negotiation
or safe space treatment and being allowed to communicate based on the coefficients in the same
column, and the final row reports the p-value from a one-sided test of whether the negotiation and
communication effect is greater than the safe space and communication effect. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust. * denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table 9: The Effect of Negotiation and Communication on a Daughter’s Propensity to Return
an Additional Token to her Parent
(1) (2)
Tokens Returned Tokens Returned
Communication × Negotiation × Shock 0.464** 0.535*
(0.234) (0.273)
Negotiation 0.568 0.797
(0.492) (0.582)
Safe Space -0.021 0.426
(0.190) (0.640)
Communication 0.166 0.378
(0.454) (0.595)
Communication × Negotiation -1.369* -1.582*
(0.738) (0.848)
Communication × Safe Space 0.363 -0.054
(0.281) (0.910)
Shock 0.437*** 0.514***
(0.097) (0.137)
Negotiation × Shock -0.202 -0.279
(0.154) (0.186)
Communication × Shock -0.201 -0.272
(0.141) (0.194)
Safe Space × Shock -0.150
(0.200)
Communication × Safe Space × Shock 0.140
(0.296)
Control Mean 4.575 4.575
Number of observations 1,219 1,219
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.242
Pass-Through Rates for Girls in Communication Investment Game
Control Pass Through 0.236** 0.242*
(0.104) (0.138)
Negotiation Pass Through 0.498*** 0.498***
(0.142) (0.147)
Safe Space Pass Through 0.232
(0.168)
One-sided Test for Neg vs. SS (P-value) 0.117
The top panel of this table reports the effects of the negotiation treatment on daugh-
ters’ propensity to return additional tokens to parents in the lab-in-the-field investment
game. Column 1 includes controls for negotiation, safe space, communication, the com-
munication game, fixed effects for the number of tokens parents sent the daughter, the
triple interaction of the daughter’s number of tokens, negotiation, and the communica-
tion game, and the relevant double interactions. Column 2 adds the double and triple
interactions between safe space, communication, and the daughter’s number of tokens.
All columns include the information treatment, ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed ef-
fects, and socioeconomic controls, consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives
with the biological father, lives with the biological mother, lives with both mother and
father, parents were paying school fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja
excellently, speaking Nyanja excellently, reading English excellently, speaking English
excellently, reading Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading English well, and speak-
ing English well. The bottom panel reports the pass through of giving a daughter an
extra token to parents in the communication version of the investment game, calcu-
lated using the regression coefficients. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
* denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Appendix A: Information Treatment Appendix
This appendix describes the details of the information treatment. The information treatment
provided during the baseline survey addressed the following points: the benefits for girls from
staying in school, job opportunities in Zambia, options for families to finance education,
HIV transmission, and HIV relative risk and prevention. In the education section of the
information session, the discussion leader started the discussion by asking girls to think
about ways in which education could help them in their lives. After a brain storming session,
the leader provided information on the link between maternal education and health of the
child, the positive effect of education on a woman’s own health, and how education could
improve a girl’s ability to care for her family.
Following the section on the benefits of education for health, the girls engaged in an-
other activity where they were asked to look through job advertisements in a newspaper and
identify required education for the positions, as well as earnings. This was done to make op-
portunities that require a secondary school degree salient to the girls. This section concluded
with information on organizations that offer scholarships and other forms of assistance for
secondary school education.
The second part of the treatment focused on the prevention of HIV. The girls were first
provided basic information on what HIV is, its prevalence in Zambia, ways to get tested for
it, and how to cope with HIV. Then, the discussion leader asked girls to identify ways in
which HIV could be transmitted from a list of behaviors and activities on a flip chart. This
exercise was followed by explanations of abstinence and condom use. The session concluded
with the discussion leader providing information on risky behaviors for contracting HIV,
such as sexual contact with older men, who have a higher positive HIV rate, and having
multiple partners.
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Appendix B: Safe Space Treatment Appendix
The safe space program was designed to mirror as much as possible the elements of the
negotiation program other than the actual content of the lessons themselves. Thus, because
the negotiation program involved brief “ice breakers” at the start of each class, these were
included in the safe space program too. Additionally, because the negotiation program had
fun elements, girls were given opportunities to play games with one another during the safe
space program. And, because the negotiation program included access to a female mentor,
the same female “coaches” who taught the negotiation program served as the supervisors
for the safe space program. However, other than the initial ice breakers, their role in the
safe space program was passive. In the case of the safe space program, the supervisors
were instructed to take a non-interventionist role. They would distribute lunches, begin the
program with an ice breaker, and then allow the girls to play games or do homework with
one another. The supervisors would maintain their presence for the same length of time as
in the negotiation program. In order to encourage the girls to interact with one another,
small games and items such as cards, jacks, and hula hoops were provided. We cannot rule
out that the time to do homework and the unstructured interaction with other girls in a
safe space provided benefits over and above what the negotiation program provided, since
girls in the negotiation program did not have those benefits. However, we wanted to keep
the total time spent in the program constant, in case our effects were driven by girls being
kept from negative activities during that time period. Therefore, any additional effects of
the negotiation program versus the safe space program should be interpreted as the lower
bound of the marginal effects of the skills portion of the program only.
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Appendix C: Data Appendix
In this appendix, we discuss how we collected administrative data on participants’ outcomes.
Administrative data collection started in mid-2013 when participants were in grade 8, two
weeks before the start of the intervention, and continued (in the case of pregnancy and
enrollment) through 2016.
While the girls were enrolled in the sample schools in grades 8 and 9, collectors visited
the schools twice in every academic term, at the beginning and at the end. At the end
of each term, they collected attendance registers from the term and left the registers for
the following term in advance, so that they could be used to collect attendance data in the
first week of school. They also dropped off data forms for exam results, fee payment, and
student status tracking, which they then collected at the start-of-term visit. In each school,
a teacher was appointed as the “contact teacher,” as a point of reference for our collectors
and a mediator between the school administration, the collectors, and the class monitors.
After the girls aged out of the sample schools, we continued to collect their enrollment and
pregnancy data, as we detail below.
Attendance Data: Daily attendance records were not collected on a regular basis prior to
the intervention, so our data collectors selected and trained pupils (“class monitors”) to fill
out attendance register forms that we provided. Recording started approximately two weeks
before the baseline survey, on the same day the invitation letters for parents to participate
in the experiment were delivered to the girls in school. Data collection covered grade 8 and
terms 1 and 2 of grade 9.
Fee Payment Data: Data on payments were collected from school administrators for each
term and each subject, starting in term 2 of grade 8. As before, the data collection covered
grades 8 and 9.
Exam Data: At the end of grade 9, girls could take the national exam and decide whether
to enroll in secondary school. In addition to the data we collected from the junior secondary
schools, we also collected the girls’ examination results for the grade 9 national exam, which
is a high stakes, standardized assessment, held in October-November 2014. The results of the
national exam determine whether pupils can enroll in grade 10 and at which school. In order
to facilitate the process of matching exam scores to participants, we collected examination
numbers for all pupils prior to the exam in term 3 of 2014.
Enrollment and Pregnancy Data: Data on whether students were still enrolled in school and
whether they had become pregnant were collected from school administrators at the start
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of the year. Beginning in 2014 (term 1 of grade 9), we cross-checked this data with data
collected by the class monitors. We also tracked whether participants in intervention schools
enrolled in grade 10 and 11 by contacting the basic schools in our study sample, as well
as visiting upper secondary schools in the Lusaka area. Depending on the score from the
grade 9 national exam, pupils are assigned to enroll in particular secondary schools. We
first gathered information from their basic schools to determine whether our participants
had enrolled in grade 10, and if so, at which secondary school. In order to confirm that
our participants enrolled at a particular school, we visited the secondary schools they were
assigned to throughout Lusaka and verified if they were indeed enrolled.
When pupils were found, they provided us with information on their peers’ secondary
enrollment statuses, as well as their own. We used this information to visit other secondary
schools that were not listed by the basic schools within Lusaka and searched for any par-
ticipants from our intervention. If we found girls at these schools, we collected enrollment
and pregnancy statuses. In 2016, we went back to the same secondary schools for additional
robustness checks on data collected in 2015, as well as to collect information on girls’ statuses
in grade 11.
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Appendix D: Machine Learning
The machine-learning procedure requires splitting our data set so that separate samples are
used to partition the data set (training data) and to estimate the treatment effects and
confidence intervals (estimation data). The causal tree methodology chooses partitions of
the training sample (e.g. girls with above or below a given value or set of values chosen by
the algorithm for one or more covariates) for whom the treatment of interest (negotiation) is
allowed to have different effects. The intuition behind the causal tree methodology is that,
by further splitting the training sample used to identify the partitions (already one-half of
our sample), the algorithm can select the partitions in one part of the training sample that
maximizes the out-of-sample predictive power for the other part of the training sample. By
re-estimating the heterogeneous negotiation effects indicated by the machine learning on the
training sample in a distinct estimating sample, we both ensure that our confidence intervals
are valid and that we are not merely identifying spurious relationships by “over-predicting”
random variation in the data.
While we do not choose the cut-off values for the partitions, we do choose the set of
covariates over which to search. Searching over our full set of baseline covariates is prob-
lematic since many of these covariates are highly correlated. This means (1) that, given we
are already splitting the sample, the intersections of these covariates could result in very
small samples, and (2) that statistical noise could lead the machine learning to identify one
covariate as important in one randomly chosen sample and to identify a different, highly
correlated covariate in a different sample, making the results hard to interpret. Instead, we
form two indices to include in the machine learning procedure, which capture two of the key
determinants of parental human capital investment – altruism and ability. These factors are
also key potential sources of heterogeneity in our theoretical framework.
We create an altruism index by estimating the first factor from a factor analysis of the
indicator variables for a girl living with her biological father, a girl living with her biological
mother, both parents being alive, and parents paying a girl’s fees in the pre-treatment period.
We also create an ability index by estimating the first factor from a factor analysis of the
indicator variables for reading and speaking Nyanja and English well and excellently. The
relatedness factor explains 91% of the variation in the relatedness variables, and the ability
factor explains 86% of the variation in the ability variables.
Finally, we randomly split our sample in half, and use half the sample (the training
sample) to build a causal tree to search for heterogeneous effects of negotiation on the human
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capital index. We consider partitions of the data using the ability index, the altruism index,
and age.
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Appendix Figures
Figure A1: Invitation to Participate in the Experiment
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Parents and Guardians of Grade 8 Girls, 
<NAME> Primary School is partnering with Innovations for Poverty Action Zambia (IPA) for a 
research study and after-school program for Grade 8 girls, called “Girls Arise!”  Girls will participate 
in different activities this year. Some girls will be able to participate in the program from <DATES>, 
while others will have the opportunity to participate in a second round later.  The program provides 
a safe space for girls to meet after school, have lunch, and do activities for six sessions. 
Informational meetings to explain more about the program and have you sign a permission form will 
take place at <NAME> Primary School at the following times: 
 14:00 hours - Friday, <MEETINGDATE1>, or 
 9:00 hours - Saturday, <MEETINGDATE2>, or  
 11:00 hours – Saturday, <MEETINGDATE3> 
Refreshments and KR 20 reimbursement for transport will be provided for the parent or guardian of 
each girl attending the meeting.  Whether or not you would like to learn more, please return the 
bottom portion of this form to the school by Thursday, <RETURNDATE>.   
Please note that it is important the girl’s PARENT or MAIN GUARDIAN (whoever makes household 
decisions affecting the girl) attend the meeting to give permission, and not someone else.   
Yours faithfully,  
<SCHOOL CONTACT NAME>, <TITLE>, <NAME> Primary School 
 
-----------------------------Please return below portion to school by <RETURNDATE>--------------------------- 
 
Name of Grade 8 girl:  <first_name> <last_name>  Class: <class> 
 
 
____ YES – I am interested in learning more about the program, & will attend the parent meeting on  
           (Please circle  1) 
Friday, <MEETINGDATE1> at 14 hours    Yes  
Saturday, <MEETINGDATE2> at 9 hours    Yes  
Saturday, <MEETINGDATE3> at 11 hours    Yes 
  
 
PHONE NUMBER (please provide so we can follow up with you regarding the meeting):   
______________________________________ 
 
 
____ NO – I do not want the girl to participate in this program.      
 
 
_______________________________________________      __________________________ 
Parent Signature & Name                      Date     
This figure shows the invitation to participate in the experiment received by parents.
60
Figure A2: Negotiation Curriculum
This figure shows the four key principles of the negotiation curriculum and their components.
Figure A3: Prizes from the Store in the Investment and Dictator Games
This figure shows both the prizes that the girls could purchase with tokens from the “Chuck
E. Cheese”-style store in the investment game and talk-time, which the parent exchanged
tokens for at the end of the game.
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Figure A4: Distribution of Tokens Sent by Treatment When Parents and Daughters Do and
Don’t Have the Opportunity to Communicate
This figure graphes kernel density plots of the number of tokens parents sent to their daugh-
ters in the investment game in the safe space, control, and negotiation treatments when
communication is not allowed (top graph) and when it is allowed (bottom graph).
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Table A2: Effect of Negotiation Treatment on Knowledge of Negotiation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Combined Questions
Negotiation 0.736*** 0.776*** 0.767*** 0.783***
(0.094) (0.114) (0.134) (0.080)
Safe Space -0.068 -0.172 -0.117 -0.097
(0.086) (0.116) (0.134) (0.079)
Number of Observations 1,523 1,569 1,569 1,515
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.070 0.062 0.130
This table reports the effect of the negotiation treatment on girls’ understanding of negotia-
tion skills in the midline survey. Girls were asked how they would apply negotiation skills in
a scenario that the curriculum had not directly discussed. The scenario was that a girl has to
negotiate with her sister over who would watch their brother when she has to study for a test.
The vignette was designed to test how girls would apply their negotiation skills rather than
whether they had learned the terminology from the course. Performance on each of three open-
ended questions was blindly graded between 1 and 7, with 7 indicating the highest score. All
columns include controls for ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed effects, and socioeconomic con-
trols, consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with the biological father, lives with
the biological mother, lives with both mother and father, parents were paying school fees in the
pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja excellently, speaking Nyanja excellently, reading English
excellently, speaking English excellently, reading Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading
English well, and speaking English well. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. * de-
notes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
Table A3: Effects of Negotiation, Safe Space, and Information on Human Capital Average
Effect Sizes Under Different Specifications
Nego Coef. Se Safe Space Se One-Sided P-value Information Se One-Sided P-value
Neg vs. SS Neg vs. Info
Baseline 0.062*** 0.019 0.021 0.018 0.020 -0.017 0.016 0.002
Parsimonious Controls 0.051*** 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.039 -0.009 0.015 0.011
No Paid Fees 0.069*** 0.022 0.025 0.019 0.017 -0.010 0.018 0.006
No Took National Exam 0.063*** 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.010 -0.017 0.017 0.003
No Attendance 0.064*** 0.022 0.017 0.020 0.013 -0.025 0.018 0.003
No Enrollment 0.055*** 0.022 0.008 0.019 0.010 -0.012 0.017 0.016
No Math 0.057*** 0.020 0.023 0.018 0.040 -0.021 0.017 0.008
No English 0.062*** 0.021 0.037* 0.019 0.079 -0.019 0.017 0.005
No Test Scores 0.057*** 0.021 0.044** 0.020 0.287 -0.025 0.018 0.003
This table reports estimates of the human capital average effect size and for negotiation, safe space, and information in the full sample of
girls in treated schools under different specifications. The table also reports p-values from a one-sided test of whether the negotiation effects
are greater than the information and safe space effects for each specification. Row 1 reports the baseline specification from Table 3. Row
2 reports the results for a specification that only controls for whether a girl reads and speaks Nyanja excellently and whether she speaks
English excellently, as well as a control for whether a girl received the information treatment and school fixed effects. Row 3 reports the AES
omitting whether parents paid school fees as a component. Row 4 omits taking the national exam, row 5 omits attendance as a component,
row 6 omits enrollment, row 7 omits the math threshold, row 8 omits the English threshold, and row 9 omits both scores. * denotes 10%
significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table A4: Mediation Analysis of the Negotiation Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Human Capital Human Capital Human Capital Full Index Full Index Full Index
Index Index Index
Negotiation 0.102*** 0.083** 0.060* 0.101*** 0.086*** 0.067**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Mean Knowledge Measure 0.024** 0.019
(0.011) (0.011)
IV Knowledge Measure 0.055** 0.044*
(0.024) (0.023)
First Stage F-Statistic 36.33 36.33
Number of Observations 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.048 0.058 0.053 0.055 0.071
This table reports estimates of the effect of negotiation on the human capital and full indices for the sample of girls for whom
measures of negotiation knowledge are available. Columns 2 and 5 measure knowledge of negotiation as girls’ average scores
across the three knowledge measures. Columns 3 and 6 reduce measurement error by instrumenting for a girl’s score on the third
knowledge measure with her score on the previous two. All columns include controls for ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed ef-
fects, and socioeconomic controls, consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with the biological father, lives with the
biological mother, lives with both mother and father, parents were paying school fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja
excellently, speaking Nyanja excellently, reading English excellently, speaking English excellently, reading Nyanja well, speaking
Nyanja well, reading English well, and speaking English well. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. * denotes 10% sig-
nificance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table A5: Association Between Girls’ Characteristics and Appearing in the Midline
Likelihood in Investment Game
Coeff. SE Coeff. for Interaction SE
with Negotiation
Negotiation 0.024 0.020
Safe Space 0.015 0.020
Both Parents Alive 0.049** 0.022 -0.061 0.045
Live With Bio Dad 0.051*** 0.019 -0.079** 0.040
Live With Bio Mom 0.110*** 0.022 -0.052 0.045
Live With Mom and Dad 0.082*** 0.019 -0.084** 0.039
Parents Pay Fees 0.044* 0.023 -0.042 0.048
Read Nyanja Excellently 0.053*** 0.019 -0.040 0.040
Speak Nyanja Excellently 0.029 0.019 -0.036 0.040
Read English Excellently 0.042** 0.021 0.018 0.043
Speak English Excellently 0.035* 0.020 0.017 0.040
Age -0.024*** 0.007 0.004 0.014
Read Nyanja Well 0.058*** 0.020 -0.011 0.041
Speak Nyanja Well 0.017 0.031 0.012 0.063
Read English Well 0.068** 0.033 0.058 0.068
Speak English Well 0.037 0.024 0.049 0.04)
Bride Price 0.022 0.022 0.039 0.045
The first two columns of this table report the association between different
daughter characteristics and an indicator variable for whether the daughter
attended the investment game. The second two columns report the coeffi-
cient on the interaction between negotiation and the characteristic of interest,
controlling for negotiation and the characteristic. Each cell of the table is a
regression of the indicator variable for appearing for the game on a different
characteristic or the interaction between negotiation and that characteristic,
controlling for school fixed effects. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust. * denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table A6: Heterogeneous Effects of Safe Space by Ability
Panel A. Human Capital Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Human Capital Human Capital Paid All Took National Threshold Threshold Attendance Enrollment
Index AES Fees Exam Math English Rate Rate
Safe Space × High Ability 0.046 0.046 0.057 0.075** -0.001 -0.038 0.001 0.013
(0.049) (0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.040) (0.043) (0.012) (0.022)
SD 0.122 0.249** -0.002 -0.091 0.007 0.048
Safe Space × Low Ability 0.066 0.098*** -0.025 0.060 0.035 -0.003 0.023* 0.046*
(0.053) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.031) (0.035) (0.011) (0.024)
SD -0.054 0.199 0.084 -0.006 0.147* 0.167*
Control Mean -0.018 0.693 0.864 0.532 0.711 0.211 0.220
Number of Observations 1,021 1,034 1,047 1,048 1,054 1,047 1,047
Adjusted R2 0.027 -0.002 0.014 0.021 0.023 -0.006 0.051
Panel B. Full Index and Pregnancy
(1) (2) (3)
Full Full Ever
Index AES Pregnant
Safe Space × High Ability 0.052 0.022 -0.024
(0.052) (0.037) (0.024)
SD -0.125
Safe Space × Low Ability 0.060 0.074** -0.012
(0.052) (0.033) (0.018)
SD -0.060
Control Mean -0.019 0.041
Number of Observations 1,021 1,054
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.030
This table reports estimates of the effect of safe space by whether or not girls’ ability factor is greater than 0.45 (the partitions of the treatment effect indi-
cated by the machine learning) on outcomes collected in the administrative data. An ability factor above 0.45 corresponds to the top 40th percentile of the
ability distribution. The estimation data set is a randomly chosen subsample of the full data which was held back and not used in the machine learning that
established partitions of the data. Estimates are reported both in the natural units of the data and in terms of standard deviations of the control group, so
that the effects are in the same units as the average effect sizes. Panel A: In column 1, the outcome is a human capital index constructed by standardizing
each of the outcomes in columns 3-8 and taking their average. In column 2, the effect sizes are the average effect sizes from columns 3-8. In column 3, the
outcome is an indicator variable equal to 1 if parents paid 9th grade school fees and 0 otherwise. In column 4, the outcome is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the student took the national exam at the end of grade 9. In column 5, the outcome is 1 if the student received greater than the 75th percentile on
the national exam in math and 0 otherwise and in column 6, it is the same for English. In column 7, the outcome is the students’ average post-treatment
attendance rate in grade 8 and terms 1 and 2 of grade 9. In column 8, the outcome is the student’s average enrollment rate in term 3 of grade 8 and terms
1 and 2 of grade 9. Panel B: In column 1, the outcome is the full index including the pregnancy dummy (with its sign flipped), and in column 2, it is the
average effect size including pregnancy. In column 3, the outcome is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the student is ever observed to be pregnant in the
post-treatment period. All columns in both panels include the information treatment, ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed effects, and socioeconomic controls,
consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with the biological father, lives with biological mother, lives with both mother and father, parents were
paying school fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja excellently, speaking Nyanja excellently, reading English excellently, speaking English excel-
lently, reading Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading English well, and speaking English well. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. * denotes
10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table A7: Effect of Negotiation on Knowledge of Negotiation by Ability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Combined Questions
Negotiation × Low Ability 0.652*** 0.767*** 0.779*** 0.743***
(0.114) (0.137) (0.160) (0.096)
Negotiation × High Ability 0.884*** 0.790*** 0.744*** 0.852***
(0.144) (0.172) (0.203) (0.123)
Safe Space -0.065 -0.171 -0.116 -0.094
(0.086) (0.116) (0.134) (0.079)
High Ability -0.154 -0.085 -0.103 -0.173
(0.146) (0.184) (0.217) (0.129)
Number of Observations 1,523 1,569 1,569 1,515
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.069 0.061 0.130
This table reports the effect of the negotiation treatment on girls’ understanding of negotiation
skills in the midline survey, allowing the effect of the treatment to differ by girls’ baseline abil-
ity. Girls were asked how they would apply negotiation skills in a scenario that the curriculum
had not directly discussed. The scenario asked a girl to negotiate with her sister over who would
watch their brother when she has to study for a test. The vignette was designed to test how girls
would apply their negotiation skills rather than whether they had learned the terminology from the
course. Performance on each of three open-ended questions was blindly graded between 1 and 7,
with 7 indicating the highest score. All columns include controls for ethnicity fixed effects, school
fixed effects, and socioeconomic controls, consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with
the biological father, lives with biological mother, lives with both mother and father, parents were
paying school fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja excellently, speaking Nyanja ex-
cellently, reading English excellently, speaking English excellently, reading Nyanja well, speaking
Nyanja well, reading English well, and speaking English well. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-
ity robust. * denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
Table A8: Number of Girls in Each Treatment in the Investment Game
(1) (2) (3)
DG Communication Non-Communication
No Word Game 333 318 350
Word Game 0 329 332
This table reports the number of girls assigned to each treat-
ment arm in the lab-in-the-field investment game.
68
Table A9: Association Between Investment in the Lab-in-the-Field Game and Human Capital
Investment
(1) (2) (3)
Human Capital Human Capital Human Capital
Index Index Index
Tokens Sent 0.015 0.014**
(0.020) (0.007)
Tokens Sent × Communication 0.021*
(0.011)
Tokens Sent × No Communication 0.006
(0.012)
Control Mean 0.021 0.003 0.003
Sample DG Only IG Only IG Only
Number of Observations 286 1,204 1,204
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.037 0.037
This table reports the relationship between the number of tokens parents sent girls in the in-
vestment game and the human capital index. All columns include controls for the information
treatment, ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed effects, and socioeconomic controls, consisting of
variables for both parents alive, lives with the biological father, lives with the biological mother,
lives with both mother and father, parents were paying school fees in the pre-treatment period,
reading Nyanja excellently, speaking Nyanja excellently, reading English excellently, speaking
English excellently, reading Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading English well, and speak-
ing English well. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. * denotes 10% significance, **
denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table A10: Effect of Word Game on Parents’ Behavior in the Investment Game
(1) (2)
Tokens Sent Tokens Sent
Negotiation -0.506** -0.539**
(0.225) (0.258)
Safe Space -0.274 -0.376
(0.224) (0.254)
Communication -0.092 -0.089
(0.195) (0.291)
Communication × Negotiation 0.783*** 0.856**
(0.263) (0.383)
Communication × Safe Space 0.449* 0.659*
(0.263) (0.382)
Word Game dummy -0.044 -0.042
(0.189) (0.266)
Word × Negotiation 0.078 0.146
(0.258) (0.355)
Word × Safe Space -0.252 -0.037
(0.264) (0.363)
Communication × Word -0.004
(0.389)
Communication × Word × Negotiation -0.142
(0.512)
Communication × Word × Safe Space -0.442
(0.531)
Sample IG Only IG Only
Number of Observations 1,224 1,224
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.032
This table reports the effects of the negotiation treatment on parents’
behavior in a lab-in-the-field investment game. In the investment game
(IG), parents decided how many tokens to send to daughters, and tokens
sent to daughters were doubled (plus a random component). Daughters
then decided how many tokens to return to guardians. In the communi-
cation treatment, daughters were allowed to communicate with guardians
before guardians sent the tokens. In the word game treatment, the to-
kens were only doubled if the girl had found at least half the words in
a word game. All columns include controls ethnicity fixed effects, school
fixed effects, and socioeconomic controls, consisting of variables for both
parents alive, lives with the biological father, lives with the biological
mother, lives with both mother and father, parents were paying school
fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja excellently, speaking
Nyanja excellently, reading English excellently, speaking English excel-
lently, reading Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading English well,
and speaking English well. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
* denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table A11: Effect of Knowledge of Negotiation on Parents’ Behavior in the Investment Game
(1) (2) (3)
Tokens Sent Tokens Sent Tokens Sent
Communication × Knowledge 0.389** 0.404**
(0.198) (0.202)
Communication × Negotiation 0.481** 0.480**
(0.240) (0.240)
Communication × Safe Space 0.152 0.146
(0.239) (0.239)
Knowledge 0.095 -0.065 -0.072
(0.097) (0.118) (0.119)
Negotiation -0.002 -0.199 -0.198
(0.116) (0.147) (0.147)
Safe Space -0.058 -0.126 -0.126
(0.116) (0.146) (0.146)
Communication -1.047* -1.086*
(0.607) (0.619)
Word Game -0.114
(0.104)
Sample IG Only IG Only IG Only
Number of Observations 1,520 1,520 1,520
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.036 0.036
This table reports the effects of knowledge of negotiation on parents’ behavior in a
lab-in-the-field investment game. All columns include controls for the information
treatment, ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed effects, and socioeconomic controls,
consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with the biological father, lives
with the biological mother, lives with both mother and father, parents were pay-
ing school fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja excellently, speaking
Nyanja excellently, reading English excellently, speaking English excellently, read-
ing Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading English well, and speaking English
well. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust. * denotes 10% significance, **
denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table A12: Effect of Negotiation Treatment on Daughters’ Outcomes in the Investment
Game
(1) (2) (3)
Daughter Total Daughter Total Daughter Total
Communication × Negotiation 0.954** 0.953**
(0.478) (0.478)
Communication × Safe Space 0.239 0.231
(0.484) (0.484)
Negotiation -0.073 -0.537* -0.535*
(0.235) (0.306) (0.307)
Safe Space -0.402* -0.524* -0.523*
(0.241) (0.308) (0.308)
Communication 0.364 0.373
(0.343) (0.345)
Word Game -0.153
(0.193)
Control Mean 9.152 9.152 9.152
Number of Observations 1,219 1,219 1,219
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.037 0.037
Effects of Negotiation and Safe Space in the Communication Arm of the Experiment
Negotiation & Communication 0.417 0.418
(0.360) (0.372)
Safe Space & Communication -0.285 -0.292
(0.372) (0.372)
Neg vs. SS One-Sided Test (P-value) 0.029 0.027
This table reports the effects of the negotiation treatment on daughters’ outcomes in a lab-in-
the-field investment game. In the investment game, parents decided how many tokens to send to
daughters, and coins sent to daughters were doubled (plus a random component). Daughters then
decided how many tokens to return to guardians. In the communication treatment, daughters
were allowed to communicate with guardians before guardians sent the tokens. In the word game
treatment, the tokens were only doubled if the girl had found at least half the words in a word
game. All columns include controls for the information treatment, ethnicity fixed effects, school
fixed effects, and socioeconomic controls, consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with
the biological father, lives with the biological mother, lives with both mother and father, parents
were paying school fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja excellently, speaking Nyanja
excellently, reading English excellently, speaking English excellently, reading Nyanja well, speaking
Nyanja well, reading English well, and speaking English well. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-
ity robust. The bottom panel reports the net effect of being a negotiation or safe space girl in the
communication game (relative to a control girl in the communication game). The last row reports
the p-value of a one-sided test of whether negotiation has larger effects than safe space among girls
in the communication treatment. * denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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Table A14: Evidence on Spillovers by Daughter’s Ability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pile, Pile, Chores, Chores, Schoolwork, Schoolwork, Pay for Years Years,
Male Female Male Female Male Female Girls Over Schooling, Schooling
Boys Male Female
Negotiation × High Ability 0.201 0.180 -0.003 0.111 0.011 0.128 0.057*** 0.064 -0.105
(0.211) (0.215) (0.163) (0.104) (0.139) (0.120) (0.021) (0.161) (0.162)
Negotiation × Low Ability -0.036 -0.067 -0.033 -0.077 0.054 0.146 0.032** -0.008 0.050
(0.188) (0.186) (0.142) (0.077) (0.116) (0.100) (0.015) (0.140) (0.127)
Safe Space 0.027 -0.170 0.037 0.050 0.069 0.112 0.017 -0.062 -0.004
(0.152) (0.157) (0.117) (0.074) (0.094) (0.085) (0.012) (0.118) (0.110)
Control Mean 6.668 7.065 0.618 1.405 0.827 0.790 0.022 14.997 14.978
School FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Standard Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of Observations 1,160 1,205 1,203 1,166 885 945 1,476 1,094 1,148
Adjusted R2 0.016 -0.016 0.005 -0.005 0.020 0.013 0.008 0.047 0.041
This table reports the results of tests for spillovers on siblings from the negotiation program by the treated girl’s ability. For columns 1 and 2,
parents were asked to divide up 20 tokens to represent how they would allocate resources to the treated girl and her nearest male (column 1) and
female siblings (column 2). In columns 3 and 4, parents were asked how much time the male and female siblings spent on chores in hours on the
last weekday. In columns 5 and 6, they were asked how much time they spent on school work in hours on the last weekday. In column 7, they were
asked if they were now more likely to pay girls’ school fees over boys’. In columns 8 and 9, parents were asked how many years of schooling the
male and female siblings were likely to attain. Standard controls include the information treatment, ethnicity fixed effects, school fixed effects, and
socioeconomic controls, consisting of variables for both parents alive, lives with the biological father, lives with the biological mother, lives with both
mother and father, parents were paying school fees in the pre-treatment period, reading Nyanja excellently, speaking Nyanja excellently, reading En-
glish excellently, speaking English excellently, reading Nyanja well, speaking Nyanja well, reading English well, and speaking English well. Standard
errors for the midline outcomes are heteroskedasticity robust. * denotes 10% significance, ** denotes 5%, and *** denotes 1%.
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